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Abstract
We study a longitudinal sample of over one million French workers and over 500,000
employing firms. Real total annual compensation per worker is decomposed into components
related to observable characteristics, worker heterogeneity, firm heterogeneity and residual
variation. Except for the residual, all components may be correlated in an arbitrary fashion. At
the level of the individual, we find that person- ffects, especially those not related to
observables like education, are a very important source of wage variation in France. Firm-
effects, while important, are not as important as person-effects. At the level of firms, we find that
enterprises that hire high-wage workers are more productive but not more profitable. They are
also more capital and high-skilled employee intensive. Enterprises that pay higher wages,
controlling for person-effects, are more productive and more profitable. They are also more
capital intensive but are not more high-skilled labor intensive. We also find that person- ffects
explain 92% of inter-industry wage differentials.
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1.  Introduction
For several decades labor economists have lamented the lack of microeconomic data
relating characteristics of firms to characteristics of their workers (see, for example, Rosen
(1986) and Willis (1986)) because such data would permit researchers to begin to disentangle
the effects of firm-level human resource policies from the effects of external choices made by
individual workers. Why do high-compensation firms pay more than the apparent going wage?
Perhaps such a strategy delivers a gain in productivity or profitability that exceeds the
incremental wage cost, as predicted by efficiency wage and agency models.1  Perhaps
high-paying firms select workers with higher external wage rates, thus sorting the workers into
firms that have differential observed compensation programs.2  Although broadly representative
linked surveys of firms and workers are not available in the U.S., there have now been
numerous studies that attempt to relate firm performance to the design of the compensation
system.3  Furthermore, many have analyzed the inter-industry wage differentials among
individuals as they were the manifestation of differences in firm level compensation policies.4  In
this paper we present the first extensive statistical analysis of the individual- and firm-level
heterogeneity in compensation determination. We examine variation in personal wage rates
holding firm-effects constant and variation in firm wage rates holding personal effects constant.
Due to the longitudinal nature of our data, we are able to control for both measured and
unmeasured heterogeneity in the workers and their employing firms.
A high-wage worker is a person with total compensation higher than expected on the
basis of observable characteristics like labor force experience, education, region, or sex. A
high-wage firm is an employer with compensation higher than expected given these same
observable characteristics. Until now all empirical analyses of personal and firm heterogeneity in
compensation outcomes have relied upon data that were inadequate to identify separately the
individual-effect necessary to classify a worker as high-wage and the firm-effect required to
classify a firm as high-wage. Using a unique longitudinal data set on firms and workers that is
                                                 
1 See Lazear (1979), Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), Hart and Holmstrom (1987) and Sappington (1991) for concise
statements of the theories generating these predictions. Tests of these models have been performed by Abowd (1990), Abowd
and Kramarz (1993), Cahuc and Dormont (1992), Gibbons and Murphy (1990, 1992) and Hutchens (1987) Kahn and Sherer
(1990), Leonard (1990).
2 This view is espoused by Bulow and Summers (1976), Cain (1976), Jovanovic (1979), and Roy (1951). Some tests of
these models include Dickens and Lang (1985), Flinn (1986), Gibbons and Katz (1991) and Heckman and Sedlacek (1985).
3 See Ehrenberg and Milkovich (1987), Ehrenberg (1990), Ichniowski and Shaw (1993).
4 See Dickens and Katz (1987), Gibbons and Katz (1992), Groshen (1991), Krueger and Summers (1988), Thaler
(1989).
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representative of private French employment, we are able to estimate both components of
compensation determination, allowing for unrestricted correlation among them. In the estimated
models, we find that individual-effects are statistically more important than firm-effects and that
the two are not strongly correlated; however, the economic interpretation of these statements is
complicated by the mobility patterns in the data. Although our statistical model allows for the
identification of both firm- and individual-effects, we show that for many simple economic
models, the structural heterogeneity of the workers and employers is not identical to the
statistical heterogeneity measured by our descriptive model.
We use the results of our individual-level data analysis to relate firm-level outcomes and
choices to the structure of the firm's compensation policy. Specifically, we ask whether firms that
hire high-wage workers are more profitable (no), more productive per worker (yes), more capital
intensive (yes), more professional-employment intensive (yes), more skilled labor intensive (no)
and more likely to survive (yes). Second, we ask whether high-wage firms are more profitable
(yes), more productive per worker (yes), more capital intensive (yes), more
professional-employment intensive (no), more skilled labor intensive (no) and more likely to
survive (maybe). Finally, we aggregate our results to the industry level, where we find that
high-wage workers and high-wage firms are both explanations of the inter-industry wage
differential with high-wage workers being much more important empirically.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our analysis data set. Section 3
describes our methods for identifying and estimating the large number of statistical effects that
characterize worker and firm compensation heterogeneity and provides several potential
economic interpretations of the descriptive model's parameters. Section 4 describes our results.
Section 5 concludes. A Data Appendix describes our manipulation of the French data in great
detail. Finally, a Model Appendix gives details of the theoretical calculations.
2  Data Description and Sampling Plans
Our sample of workers comes from the Declarations Annuelles de Salaires (DAS), an
annual survey of employer-r ported earnings subject to French social security taxes. We follow
approximately one million individuals over the years from 1976 to 1987. The sample is a 1/25th
extract of the French work force, excluding government employees (but including employees of
government-owned businesses). Our compensation measure is the real total annual
compensation cost for the employee. This includes direct salary and all benefit costs.5 The da a
source reports the number of days worked per year. Part time workers were excluded. The total
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compensation measure for part year workers was annualized on a base of 360 days per year.
The data included the individual's age, sex, location of job, occupation, and an identifier for the
employer. We supplemented these data with information on the individual's education, available
for ten percent of the sample and imputed for the rest (see the Data Appendix). We followed
workers and employers across years and assigned a worker to the employer for which he or she
had the largest number of paid days in a given year. We refer to the resulting analysis data file
as the "individual data."
Our sample of firms comes from the annual survey Benefices Industriels et
Commerciaux (BIC), which collects a large amount of income statement, balance sheet,
employment and flow of funds information in support of the French national accounts. We use a
probability sample of 20,000 of these firms, followed from 1978 to 1988, constructed by INSEE
to facilitate research on firms (INSEE, 1989, 1990a-1 90c). Our measures of firm performance
include value added per employee, operating income as a proportion of total assets and sales
per employee. As measures of factor inputs we calculated total real assets and total year-end
employment. We added detailed measures of the firm's employment structure (professional,
skilled and unskilled) from the annual Enquete sur la Structure des Emplois (Survey of
employment structure). We refer to the resulting analysis data file as the "firm data."
The worker and firm samples are linked using an identification number (SIREN) for the
employer that corresponds to a business unit-one or more establishments engaged in a related
economic activity. Thus, our analysis of firm-effects is at the level of an enterprise and not at the
level of establishments. We do not use the ownership structure of our firms. When the
enterprises change owners but remain in the same business, their SIRENS do not normally
change. Thus, we are able to follow the economic activity of our firms through most financial
and ownership restructurations. We use the linked individual-firm data to estimate the relation
among various compensation policies and firm-level economic variables
3  A Statistical Model for Individual Compensation
The basic compensation equation for an individual is given by
yit = xitb + qi + yJ(i,t)it + eit  (1)
where yit is the compensation of individual i = 1, ..., N, for time t = Fi,..., Li, Fi is the first year an
individual appears in the data, Li is the last year s/he appears in the sample, and the function
J(i,t) gives the identity j of the employing firm for individual i at date t. The effect xitb is th
                                                                                                                                                    
5 Some components of employer compensation costs were estimated by the Revenus division at INSEE.
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predicted effect of time varying, person-specific characteristics xit with b being a vector of
parameters to be estimated. The time-invariant individual-effect qi is decomposed as
qi = ai + uih (2)
where ui is a vector of observable time-invariant person-specific characterist cs and h is a vector
of parameters to be estimated. The firm-effect yJ(i,t)it is decomposed as
yJ(i,t)it = fJ(i,t) + l1 J(i,t) sJ(i,t)it + l2 J(i,t) T1(sJ(i,t)it - 10) (3)
where fJ(i,t), l1 J(i,t), and l2 J(i,t) are firm-specific parameters to be estimated, sJ(i,t)it is individual i's
seniority at date t in firm J(i,t) and the function T1(z) is the linear spline basis function
6
T1(z) = 0 for z < 0,  z for z >0 . (4)
Finally, the error term eit is stochastically independent of all other effects in equation (1) with
E[eit] = 0 and Var[eit] = se2. The stochastic structure of xit,b, and yJ(i,t)it is unrestricted so that
these effects may be cross-correlated. The identification conditions imposed upon the model are
0=å
i
ia
and
å =
ti
ittiJ
,
),( 0y .
3.1  Potential Interpretations of the Descriptive Model
We illustrate the relation between structural heterogeneity in the populations of workers
(heterogeneous abilities or tastes) and firms (heterogeneous efficiencies or technologies) and
the statistical heterogeneity in equation (1) using three economic models with very simple
population structures. In each case we derive the conditional expectation of individual
compensation given the identity of the employing firm and the individual. We then relate the
parameters of this conditional expectation to our statistical parameterization above.
3.1.1  A matching model with endogenous turnover
Suppose that workers are homogeneous. There are two types of firms, m and n, and two
periods. In type m firms a worker's marginal product and wage rate are always w*, and
employment is always available in a type m firm.  In type n firms there is a matching process.
Worker i's productivity is w* + ein in both periods with ein drawn from a binomial distribution
                                                 
6 The use of a linear spline at 10 years of seniority is a specification that we found better suited to these data than a
quadratic. As will become evident below, three parameters at the firm level is already quite flexible and we did not find much to
be gained by adding addition polynomial terms in seniority.
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B(-H,H,1/2). The matching outcome, ein unknown to both the worker and the firm at the
beginning of the first period of employment, is realized at the end of the first period and
becomes public information. Workers are offered contracts at the beginning of the first period of
the form (w1,w2) and workers may leave firm n at the end of the first period. All firms make zero
profits. The equilibrium contract for firms of type n is (w* - H/2, + ein).  All workers in type n
firms with a bad matching outcome (-H) quit to type m firms.
To simplify the model, we consider a stationary situation with nine workers wh  live for
two periods each, three born in period 0, three born in period 1, three born in period 2. Two
workers in each generation enter type n firms, one worker in each generation enters a type m
firm. Of the two workers who entered type n firms, let one draw a positive matching outcome
and the other draw a negative matching outcome. The worker with the negative matching
outcome leaves the type n firm for a type m firm when the matching parameter is made public.
The structure of the data implied by this theoretical model is shown in appendix Table B1. This
corresponds to the following parameter values in our descriptive model:
m = w*
where m is the overall mean;
ai = 0, i = 1,…9
where aI is the person I person-effect;
(fm.gm) = (0,0)
for the type m firm compensation policy; and
(fm.gm) = (-H/2,3H/2)
for the type n firm compensation policy.
3.1.2  A rent-splitting model with exogenous turnover
Suppose there are four different individuals, two types of firms, m and n, and two time
periods. Each of the two firms earns quasi-rents of qjt, and the quasi-rents are split by
negotiation so that the workers receive a share sj of the quasi-rent in firm j. Suppose that each
firm employs two workers. With probability one, exactly one worker is randomly selected to
separate from the period one employer and be re-employed at the other firm in the second
period. All information about the workers and firms is known to those parties but not to the
statistician. All workers are included in the data sample and the typical worker has wages of the
form:
yit = xi + sjqjt
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where xj is the measure of wage rate heterogeneity, i.e. the worker type, qjt follows a binomial
distribution B(-Q,Q,1/2), i = 1..., 4, j = m, n, and t=1,2.
Table B2 shows the relation among the theoretical parameters, xi, sj, and Q, and the
statistical parameters of equation (1) for each worker and each period. The model cannot be
solved exactly. Thus, we use these relations to solve, by least squares, the moment equations
that determine the relations between the statistical parameters and the model parameters. This
yields:
i
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=
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m
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are respectively the type m and type n firms' policies.
3.1.3  An incentive model with unobserved individual heterogeneity
Following Kramarz and Rey (1994), consider workers who are heterogeneous with
respect to a parameter q Î[0,1], which is known to them but not known to the firms. Suppose,
furthermore, that there are two types of firms, m and n, that differ according to their technology,
and that there are two time periods. At type m firms, workers are hired for one period and have
a level of productivity y* regardless of their q. At type n firms, workers are hired in period one,
produce y regardless of their q, and choose an effort level, either 0 or E, to exert during
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on-the-job training. At the end of the first period, workers in firm type n take a forml, verifiable
test. If worker q exerts effort E, the test is passed with probability q. Otherwise, the test is
passed with probability kq, where (0 < k < 1). At the beginning of the second period, the firm
decides which workers to keep and the workers may leave on their own. Workers who exert
effort E have a level of productivity in the second period of y + tq if they remain in a type n firm.
There are many type m firms and two type n firms, which compete for workers in both
periods. Workers in type m firms always receive a wage w*. Workers in type n firms are offered
a wage contract (w1(q), w2(q), b(q)), where w1(q) is the first period wage, w2(q) is the second
period wage, and b(q) is the bonus paid to those who pass the test. In equilibrium all firms of
both types make zero profits because of the competition to attract workers. Furthermore, if y +
d(y + tq) is convex in q (d being the rate of discount of future earnings), the equilibrium contract
will be such that w1(q) = y-qb*(q), w2(q) = y + tq, and
))(()( qyydq
d
qb td ++=
All workers with type q, q > p, will choose to enter one of the type n firms and will choose to
exert effort E when b(p) > 
pk
E
)1( -
 .7
To simplify the model, we suppose that 
2
2q
q =  and that parameters are such that p =
1/3. We also suppose that there are nine workers, three of whom are employed by type m firms
and the remaining six work in type n firms.
Appendix Table B3 shows the wage of every individual in each firm and in each period in
terms of the theoretical model, as well as in terms of the descriptive model. These equations
can be solved in order to express each parameter of the descriptive model using parameters of
the theoretical model. As in the rent-spli ting model, the solution is not exact-we must use least
squares to express the function of the theoretical parameters that is closest to the statistical
parameter. To see why, consider the workers in type n firms. Individual 7 passed the test and,
consequently, received a bonus. This result generates a seniority slope for individual 7.
Individual 8 did not pass the test and therefore received no bonus in period 2. Thus individual 8
has a different seniority slope in the same firm. The statistical parameter gn measures the
average seniority slope in the firm n. Thus, the resulting estimated seniority slope will be the
least squares estimate of the average of the two slopes. We illustrate these solutions for all the
statistical parameters below.
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The overall mean, m, is given by the following:
3
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The individual effects, ai i = 4,5,6,7 are:
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and those for individual i = 8,9 are:
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where k = 8,9, i ¹  k. Finally, the individual effects for i = 1,2,3 and the firm effects for m are not
separately identifiable, since there are no movements between firms. We arbitrarily set:
ai = 0, i = 1,2,3
for these individuals, implying a firm effect of:
3
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For type n firms we have:
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The seniority slopes are:
gm = 0
for firm m and
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for firm n.
Notice that the ai of the workers in the type n firm depend upon their hidden
characteristics qi as well as the characteristics of their fellow workers. Note also that the
intercept in type m firms is larger than that of type n firms. Finally, as mentioned above, the
seniority slope, gn, in type n firms is the least squares average of the career paths in the firm,
depending on the success or failure of the test.
Although we do not attempt to recover the parameters of any particular theoretical model
from the estimates produced below, we will use the simpl theoretical frameworks outlined in
                                                                                                                                                    
7 Proofs of all these assertions can be found in Kramarz and Rey (1994).
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this subsection to comment upon the results. No single economic model is likely to explain a
large, diverse labor market like the one we study. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind
that it is not always possible to make a direct interpretation of the statistical parameters (for
individual or firm) in terms of simple economic parameters. In general, the interpretation of a
given statistical parameter depends upon all the elements of the economic model under
consideration.
3.2  Computation and Identification in the Statistical Model
In the context of equation (1), our goal is to estimate the invariant parameters b nd h
consistently in the presence of individual- and firm-effects that may be correlated with the
person-specific characteristics. Next, we want to estimate qi and yJ(i,t)it in a manner that allows
us to use these estimates, when averaged within a firm j, as potential explanatory variables for
differences in firm productivity, profitability, factor utilization and survival. The computational
problem we face is that the least squares design matrix implied by equations (2) and (3) is
enormous and cannot be simplified using any of the standard techniques in linear models (as,
for example, in Scheffe, 1959). There are over one million individuals and 500,000 firms (of
which 14,000 have at least 10 individual-ye r observations) represented in our data. Thus,
eliminating the individual-effects from (1) by deviations from person-means leaves a high
dimension, non-sparse, non-patterned least squares equation system to solve for the
time-invariant and firm-specific parameters. Similarly, eliminating the firm-effects by deviations
from firm-means (conditional on seniority) leaves an equally complex least squares equation
system to solve. Finally, adopting Chamberlain's (1984) method of projecting the individual and
firm-effects onto a set of person and firm characteristics, while permitting consistent estimation
of b and h, complicates our second goal by forcing us to model the firm-level effects of
compensation policies directly in (1).
We adopt a variant of Chamberlain's method with a simplification first proposed by
Mundlak (1978). In our projection method we project the firm-effect onto a vector of firm and
person characteristics constructed so as to allow the desired correlation among the
individual-effects, observable individual characteristics and the firm-effects. This permits
consistent estimation of b and least squares estimation of qi. The resulting estimates are then
used to produce consistent estimates of the firm- ffects and of the firm-level averages of the
individual-effects, which we use in our firm-level analysis.
It is worth discussing why we rejected two potential computational simplifications:
sampling individuals and sampling firms, thus reducing the dimensionality of the person- a d
High Wage Workers and High Wage Firms                                                                                                                WP 94-27
Page 12
firm-effects to make the problem tractable. The person effects are typically identified by
repeated observations on the same individual and the firm effects are typically identified by
multiple employees in the same firm. When both types of effect are present in the same model,
firm-effects are identified by the presence in the sample of individuals observed for multiple
years and in multiple firms that employ other members of the sample. Without some movement
of the individuals among the firms, neither firm- no  person-effects are separately identifiable.
However, a relatively small amount of mobility suffices to identify many firm- and person-effects.
The identification of the person and firm effects for individuals w th at least two observations
occurs whenever these individuals work at least once in a firm that has at some point employed
a person who changed employers. When sampling individuals, as the size of the sample
increases, the representativeness of the estimated firm-effects improves because in small
samples of individuals the identified firm-effects are mostly from large firms, whereas in larger
samples the additional individuals increase the probability that there will be a mover among the
smaller firms. Furthermore, reducing the size of the individual sample would have prevented us
from estimating firm-specific seniority returns because there are fewerand fewer firms with
adequate sample sizes as the sample of individuals is reduced. On the other hand, when
sampling firms we can estimate only selected firm-ef ects using all the available individual
observations, assuming that the firm-effects from the nonsampled firms are zero. To obtain a
representative, reasonably large set of firm-e fect estimates, this procedure would have to be
repeated many times (approximately 1,000 times to reproduce the firm-effects we have esti-
mated by our preferred method). It is not obvious that this procedure offers any computational
advantages.
Regardless of the computational approach used, between-employer mobility of the
individuals is essential for the identification of our statistical model. Table 1 examines the
pattern of inter-employer movements among all sample individuals. The rows of Table 1
correspond to the number of years a person is in the sample. The columns, with the exception
of column (1a), correspond to the number of employers the individual had. An individual
contributes to only one cell (again, excepting column (1a)). Notice that 59.4% of the individuals
in the sample never change employers (column (1)).8  Approximately one-fifth of the single
employer individuals worked in firms with no movers while four-f fths (47.9% of the overall
sample, column (1a)) worked in firms that, at one time or another, employed a person who
changed employer. Thus, 88.5% of the sample individuals contribute to the estimation of
                                                 
8 Notice that the cell (1,1) contains 318,627 individuals who appear in the sample during a single year. Some of these
individuals may represent coding errors in the person identifier; however, it is not possible to correct these errors.
High Wage Workers and High Wage Firms                                                                                                                WP 94-27
Page 13
firm-effects. It is also interesting to notice the pattern of employer spells among the movers
(columns (2)-(10)). The second line of each cell shows the most frequent configuration of
employer spells for individuals in that cell. In almost every case, short spells precede longer
spells, indicating that mobility is greater in the early career (as Topel and Ward (1992) found for
American men). It seems clear from Table 1 that the data should allow us to separate the
individual-effect from the firm-effect.
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Table 1
Structure of the Individual Data by Years in Sample and Number of Employers
(Number of Individuals, Most Common Configuration of Employers)
Years in Number of Employers
Sample 1 1a 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Total Percent
1 318,627 247,532 318,627 27.3%
1 1
2 75,299 57,411 51,066 126,365 10.8%
2 2 11
3 46,385 36,540 32,947 19,583 98,915 8.5%
3 3 12 111
4 43,019 34,922 26,631 17,191 8,330 95,171 8.2%
4 4 13 112 1111
5 41,130 34,596 26,408 15,291 8,685 3,610 95,124 8.2%
5 5 14 113 1112 11111
6 29,755 25,388 20,953 13,734 7,592 4,073 1,653 77,760 6.7%
6 6 15 114 1113 11112 111111
7 19,413 16,709 17,384 12,039 7,305 3,864 1,931 735 62,671 5.4%
7 7 16 115 1114 11113 111112 1111111
8 23,484 20,378 20,421 13,185 7,673 4,001 2,061 917 327 72,069 6.2%
8 8 44 116 1115 11114 111113 1111112 11111111
9 38,505 34,147 26,350 15,791 8,590 4,383 2,104 938 362 114 97,137 8.3%
9 9 54 117 1116 11115 111114 1111113 11111112 111111111
10 56,881 51,425 32,616 17,728 8,369 3,839 1,837 739 314 109 34 122,466 10.5%
10*10* 64 118 1117 11116 221113 1131112 11111113 1111111121111111111
Total 692,498 559,048 254,776 124,542 56,544 23,770 9,586 3,329 1,003 223 34 1,166,305100.0%
Percent 59.4% 47.9% 21.8% 10.7% 4.8% 2.0% 0.8% 0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Source: DAS individual data.
Notes: Employment configurations are described in terms of the number of consecutive years spent with each of the individual's employers, in
order (e.g. configuration 124 means that the individual spent 1 year with his first employer, then 2 years with his second employer, and finally 4
years with his third employer). Column la refers to the subset of individuals with only one employer whose employing firth had at least one other
individual who had changed firms at least once in his career (required for identification of both firm and individual effects).
* This configuration corresponds to 10 years of data with the first (and only) employer.
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3.3  A Projection Method for Estimating Correlated Effects
Our proposed method allows us to estimate the parameters 0 consistently in the
presence of both individual- nd firm-effects without adopting a step-wise approach that
imposes orthogonality among the different effects. We project the firm-eff ct onto the firm and
individual data according to the equation:
[ ][ ] ittiJxittiJittiJtiJittiJittiJtiJtiJ isTsfs ),(),(1),(),(),(2),(),(1),( )10(1)10 nlggf +ÄÄ=-++ (5)
where ittijf ),(  is a vector of time varying firm characteristics (firm size in our application), itx  is
the vector of person-averages of xit:
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1+-º iii FLT  , l is the parameter vector of the linear projection and nJ(i,t)it is the stochastic error
of the linear projection. Let
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Restated as deviations from individual-averages, equation (8) becomes
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Estimates of the individual effects qi are recovered in the conventional manner as
lbq ˆˆ iiiti zxy --= (12)
and the limit distribution of iqˆ  is
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We note that although the least squares estimate of the individual effect iqˆ  is not consistent as
¥®N , this is not a problem when we estimate firm-level models because the firm-average of
iqˆ  can be consistently estimated.
Next consider the estimation of the firm effects fJ(i,t) +g1J(i,t) sJ(i,t)it + g2J(i,t) T1(sJ(i,t)it - 10).
Define
{ } { }jtiJtij =º ),(|),( , a set with Nj elements, (14)
{ } { } { } { }jjjj xyy qb ˆˆˆ --º , (15)
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and similarly for x{j} and { }jqˆ .  Equations (14) and (15) group all of the observations on
individuals employed by the same firm into the vector { }jyˆ , which is expressed as a deviation
from the bx  effects and the individual effects. The firm-level equation is:
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Least squares estimation of (17) yields the
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To recover the ai and uIh parts of the individual effect, estimate the equation (2) by
generalized least squares to obtain hˆ , which satisfies:
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and [ ]( )iVarDiag qˆ  is a diagonal matrix containing the variances of 8; from equation (13). The
estimator of ai is
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Next we estimate the firm-level average ai, defined as aj,
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Similarly, the firm-level average education effect is given by
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with asymptotic distribution based upon (22).9
3.4  Analysis of Firm-level Outcomes
We consider next the statistical relation between firm-level outcomes and our measures
of firm-level compensation policy. Our basic model is
[ ] jjjjjjjj qup xr
p
ggfha +ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
= 21 (29)
where j = 1, ...J , the total number of firms in the firm sample, pj is any firm-level outcome,
[ ]jjjjj u 21 ggfha  is a vector of firm-level compensation measures, p is a vector of
parameters of interest, qj is a vector of other firm-level variables, r is a vector of associated
parameters and xj is a zero-mean homoscedastic statistical error. In the regression analysis,
firm-level outcomes and firm-level compensation variables were measured using data from two
independently drawn samples. However, the firm-level compensation variables derived from our
individual sample are estimated regressors. Consequently, we must allow for the estimation
errors in jaˆ , hˆju , jfˆ , j1ˆg , and j2ˆg  in our assessment of the precision of the estimation of
firm-level equations.10  Equation (29) becomes
[ ] +ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
=
r
p
ggfha jjjjjjj qup 21 ˆˆˆˆˆ
[ ] [ ]( ) jjjjjjjjjjj uu xpggfhaggfha +- 2121 ˆˆˆˆˆ (30)
where [ ] [ ]( )pggfhaggfha jjjjjjjjjj uu 2121 ˆˆˆˆˆ-  is the error associated with the
first-step estimation of the firm-level compensation measures.11  In order to derive the error
covariance matrix for equation (30), let
                                                 
9 In all our asymptotic results we hold constant. the distribution of firm sizes. Thus as N, ¥®jN , we assume that
their ratio goes to a non-zero constant.
10 The firm-level regressor bˆjx  also contains some measurement error, in principle; however, the vector ,Q is
estimated with such precision that we do not carry along its estimated covariance matrix (including its estimated covariance with
jaˆ , hˆju , jfˆ , j1ˆg , j2ˆg ) in these calculations. Hence, we place bˆjx in the list of qj.
" We adopt the model of Pagan (1984) and Murphy and Topel (1985); namely, that the regression of interest relates a
function of the individual-level data and several firm-level parameters to the other measured firm-level outcomes. We account for
the estimation error [ ] [ ]( )jjjjjjjjjj uu 2121 ˆˆˆˆˆ ggfhaggfha -  explicitly, but we do not add an additional
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( ) [ ]jjjjjjjj quP 21 ˆˆˆˆˆˆ' ggfhad º
and
[ ]jjjjjj u 21 ˆˆˆˆˆ'ˆ ggfhad º .
Now, equation (30) can be re-expressed in a first order approximation around dj as:
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The variance of the regression error term for equation (31) consists of the component due to the
estimation error in jPˆ  plus the component due to xj:
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where the components of [ ]jVardˆ  are defined in the derivations above. We estimate equation
(31) using generalized least squares based upon the error variance in equation (32).
4  Estimation Results
Table 2 shows the basic summary statistics, by sex, for the individual-le el data. The
usable sample consists of 3,434,530 observations on 711,518 men and 1,870,578 usable
observations on 454,787 women. The basic individual-level variables consist of labor force
experience, region of France, education level and seniority. Note that about 30% of the sample
has no known educational attainment. For 74% of the individuals, there are enough
observations in the sample to permit estimation of a distinct firm-effect.12  Recall from Table 1
that some 27% of our individuals appear in only one of the 10 data years while 10.6% are
present for all 10 years. More than 59% of the individuals have only a single employer while 2, 3
and 4 employers account for 21.8%, 10.7%, and 4.8% of the individuals, respectively.
                                                                                                                                                    
measurement error. Thus, for example, we assert that the outcome pj depends upon j and not upon j + j where j is an
independent measurement error.
12 The individuals from firms with fewer than 10 observations in the sample were pooled and a single firm-level
regression was used to estimate their firm-effects.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Basic Individual Level Variables by Sex for 1976 to 1987
                                                                                                                                    
                Men        Women
Variable Definition                                         Mean          Std Dev         Mean        Std Dev     
Log (Real Annual Compensation Cost, 1980 FF) 4.3442  0.5187 4.0984 0.4801
Total Labor Force Experience 17.2531 11.8258 15.4301 12.0089
(Total Labor Force Experience)2/100  4.3752 4.9197 3.8230 4.9440
(Total Labor Force Experience)3/1000 13.1530 19.4305 11.6079 19.6863
(Total Labor Force Experience)4/10000 43.3453 77.9542 39.0589 80.3251
Seniority 7.7067 7.5510  6.5437 6.5268
Lives in Ile-de-France (Paris Metropolitan Region) 0.2561 0.2910
No Known Degree 0.3064 0.2190 0.2971  0.2124
Completed Elementary School 0.1556 0.1458  0.1893  0.1739
Completed Junior High School 0.0565 0.0792 0.0869 0.1008
Completed High School (Baccalaureat)  0.0528 0.0804 0.0711 0.0881
Basic Vocational-Technical Degree 0.2652 0.1849 0.1926 0.1545
Advanced Vocational-Technical Degree 0.0701 0.0893 0.0532 0.0802
Technical College or University Diploma 0.0469 0.0754 0.0838 0.1247
Graduate School Diploma 0.0465 0.0964  0.0259 0.0551
Year of data 81.3106 3.7250 81.4730 3.7180
Number of Observations for the Firm in Sample 4402.3800 16164.6200 1605.3100 7797.1300
Observations        3,434,530 1,870,578
Persons 711,518 454,787
Sufficient Data Available to Estimate Firm Effect        0.7425                                  0.7448                           
Notes: For sources and methods see the Data Appendix.
The results of our projection method for estimating the basic regression parameters are
shown in Table 3, separately for men and women. These estimates are the results of applying
the multiple step procedure presented in section 3. The results shown in the columns
"Projection Method," thus, come from two separate regression models-the one shown in
equation (2), for the education coefficients, and the one shown in equation (9), for the
time-varying individual characteristics.13  For comparison purposes, Table 3 also shows the
ordinary least squares results, the within estimates for fixed person-eff cts and the within
estimates for fixed firm-effects. Evidently, the projection method results are much closer to the
within-person estimates than to those within firms whereas the least squares results are closer
to the within-firm estimates.
Table 4 contains descriptive statistics for the components of real compensation implied
by the estimated parameters from equation (1) separately for each sex. For both males and
                                                                                                                                                    
13 The remaining coefficients from equation (9) can be found in the Data Appendix. The seniority coefficients shown for
the projection method are the individual averages of j1ˆg  and j2ˆg  from Table 4.
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females, the standard deviation of the individual-effect, and its components a and uh, is much
larger than that of the firm-effect, and its components f, gi and g2. As noted in Table 3, the
complete parameterization in explains 80% of the variation in real salaries for men and 75% for
women; thus, the idiosyncratic component of variance is still rather important.
Table 5 shows the intercorrelations of the components of compensation. All components
of compensation except the residual account for 81% of the variance of real total annual
compensation costs (combined result for males and females). Furthermore, the ai component of
the individual-effect (the part not explained by education) is more important than the observable
regressors (xb) in explaining compensation costs. The overall firm effect, yj, on the other hand,
is only about one-quarter as important as the overall person-effect. The individual-effect and the
firm-effect are correlated 0.10 according to our results. The a and f components are correlated
0.08 acording to this method. Notice that although the firm-specific intercept, f, and the
a-component of the individual effect are positively correlated, the firm-specific intercept is
negatively correlated with the seniority slope (-0.56).
One may get the impression from Tables that the individual-effects and firm-effects are
not highly correlated. Table 6 shows that this is not completely correct. In this table we begin to
address the problem of inter-employer mobility in our sample. If the mobility in the economy is
exogenous; that is, if the probability of separation from one firm and accession into another
does not depend upon the individual's wage path, then the association of the parameter fj with
the pay practices of firm j is correct. Otherwise, the movers and stayers systematically sort
according to their values of a, , and e. In this second case, measured values of firm-effects are
contaminated by the average values of individual-effects of the movers relative to the stayers,
as can be seen in the two endogenous mobility models discussed above.
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Table 3
Estimates of the Effects of Labor Force Experience, Region and Year
on the Log of Real Total Annual Compensation Costs
Individual Data by Sex for 1976 to 1987
                                                                                                                                                                                      
    Projection Method       Least Squares        Within Persons         Within Firms
 Parameter   Standard    Parameter   Standard    Parameter   Standard    Parameter   Standard
Variable                                                          Estimate       Error         Estimate        Error         Estimate        Error         Estimate       Error        
Men
Total labor force experience 0.0729 (0.0004) 0.0522 (0.0003) 0.0675 (0.0004) 0.0434 (0.0003)
(LF experience squared)/100 -0.4509 (0.0027) 0.2189 (0.0030) 0.4435 (0.0029) 0.1518  (0.0027)
(LF experience cubed)/1000 0.1072 (0.0009)  0.0494  (0.0010)  0.1079 (0.0010)  0.0290  (0.0009)
(LF experience quartic)/10000 -0.0095  (0.0001) -0.0047  (0.0001)  -0.0097  (0.0001)  -0.0025  (0.0001)
Seniority -3.37e-05 (1.81e-05) 0.0143  (0.0001) 0.0049  (0.0001) 0.0094  (0.0001)
Seniority spline at 10 years -5.36e-04 (2.92e-05)  -0.0048  (0.0002) -0.0034  (0.0001)  -0.0030  (0.0001)
Lives in Ile-de-France 0.0800 (0.0010)  0.1400 (0.0005)  0.0820  (0.0011)  0.1116  (0.0007)
Year 1977 0.0203 (0.0007)  0.0379  (0.0010)  0.0275  (0.0008)  0.0202  (0.0009)
Year 1978 0.0531 (0.0008)  0.0692  (0.0010)  0.0640 (0.0009)  0.0489 (0.0009)
Year 1979 0.0782 (0.0009) 0.0895  (0.0010)  0.0922 (0.0010)  0.0629  (0.0009)
Year 1980 0.0914 (0.0010)  0.0957 (0.0010)  0.1076 (0.0011)  0.0678  (0.0009)
Year 1982 0.1289 (0.0014)  0.1200 (0.0011)  0.1497  (0.0015) 0.0846  (0.0009)
Year 1984 0.1723 (0.0018)  0.1505  (0.0011)  0.1973  (0.0018)  0.1045  (0.0009)
Year 1985 0.1966  (0.0020)  0.1727  (0.0011) 0.2235  (0.0020)  0.1182  (0.0009)
Year 1986 0.2304  (0.0021) 0.1906  (0.0011)  0.2592  (0.0022) 0.1349  (0.0009)
Year 1987 0.2517 (0.0023) 0.2020  (0.0011)  0.2825  (0.0024) 0.1433 (0.0009)
Elementary School Education 0.5778  (0.0036)  0.1138  (0.0020) a  0.0823 (0.0019)
Junior High School Education 0.1494 (0.0058)  0.4515  (0.0031)  a 0.3662 (0.0029)
High School Graduate 0.4249 (0.0063)  0.6665 (0.0033) a  0.5375  (0.0030)
Basic Vocational-Technical Grad. -0.0704 (0.0028)  0.2454  (0.0016)  a 0.2123 (0.0015)
Advanced Vocational-Technical Grad. 0.6136  (0.0051)  0.6325  (0.0027)  a  0.5331  (0.0025)
Technical College or Undergrad. Degree 0.1359  (0.0065)  0.6113  (0.0035) a 0.4716 (0.0031)
Graduate School Degree 1.6032  (0.0051  1.4392  (0.0028)  a 1.2604  (0.0025)
Intercept 3.6899  (0.0016) 3.4244  (0.0014)  a 0.0518  (0.0022)
Root mean square error 0.2684  0.4227 0.2685 0.3420 b
Error degrees of freedom 2,585,147  3,434,506  2,722,996 5,234,086 b
R-squared 0.7985 0.3358 0.7875 0.5715 b
Sample size                                            3,434,530                  3,434,530                 3,434,530                 5,305,108     b             
(cont. )
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Table 3 (continued)
Estimates of the Effects of Labor Force Experience, Region and Year
on the Log of Real Total Annual Compensation Costs
 Individual Data by Sex for 1976 to 1987
                                                                                                                                                                                      
    Projection Method       Least Squares       Within Persons         Within Firms
 Parameter   Standard    Parameter   Standard    Parameter   Standard    Parameter   Standard
Variable                                                          Estimate       Error         Estimate        Error         Estimate        Error         Estimate       Error        
Women
Total labor force experience 0.0334 (0.0005)  0.0299 (0.0004)  0.0268 (0.0006)  0.0210  (0.0004)
(LF experience squared)/100 --0.1796 (0.0037) -0.0938  (0.0038)  -0.1501  (0.0042) -0.0230  (0.0035)
(LF experience cubed)/1000 0.0396  (0.0013)  0.0144  (0.0013)  0.0326  (0.0015) -0.0072 (0.0012)
(LF experience quartic)/10000  -0.0032  (0.0001)  -0.0010  (0.0001)  -0.0026 (0.0002) 0.0012  (0.0001)
Seniority  8.28e-04 (2.38e-05)  0.0172  (0.0001)  0.0055  (0.0001)  0.0116 (0.0001)
Seniority spline at 10 years -1.64e-03 (4.20e-05)  -0.0069 (0.0002) -0.0074  (0.0002) -0.0031  (0.0002)
Lives in Ile-de-France 0.0782  (0.0016)  0.1577  (0.0007)  0.0794  (0.0018)  0.1217  (0.0009)
Year 1977  0.0218  (0.0010) 0.0588  (0.0014)  0.0304  (0.0011)  0.0372 (0.0012)
Year 1978  0.0638 (0.0011) 0.1135  (0.0014)  0.0766 (0.0012)  0.0832 (0.0012)
Year 1979  0.0938 (0.0012) 0.1447  (0.0014)  0.1098  (0.0014) 0.1083 (0.0012)
Year 1980  0.1093 (0.0014) 0.1548  (0.0015)  0.1276 (0.0016) 0.1192  (0.0012)
Year 1982  0.1529  (0.0018) 0.1872  (0.0015  0.1751 (0.0021)  0.1454  (0.0013)
Year 1984  0.1962  (0.0022) 0.2349  (0.0015)  0.2227  (0.0025)  0.1769  (0.0013)
Year 1985  0.2135  (0.0024) 0.2510  (0.0015)  0.2408 (0.0028)  0.1830  (0.0013)
Year 1986  0.2427  (0.0027) 0.2676  (0.0015)  0.2706 (0.0030)  0.1991 (0.0013)
Year 1987  0.2609 (0.0029)  0.2731  (0.0015)  0.2894 (0.0033) 0.2038  (0.0013)
Elementary School Education  0.2782  (0.0045)  0.0046  (0.0025)  a -0.0145  (0.0023)
Junior High School Education  0.3480  (0.0065)  0.3472 (0.0032) a  0.2445 (0.0031)
High School Graduate  0.3348  (0.0078)  0.4813  (0.0040)  a 0.3307 (0.0037)
Basic Vocational-Technical Grad.  0.1279  (0.0045)  0.2578  (0.0024)  a  0.1739  (0.0023)
Advanced Vocational-Technical Grad  0.4032  (0.0079)  0.4464 (0.0040) a  0.3208  (0.0039)
Technical College or Undergrad. Degree 0.6014  (0.0057)  0.6078  (0.0029)  a  0.4817  (0.0027)
Graduate School Degree  1.2419 (0.0123)  0.9881  (0.0064)  a 0.7933  (0.0059)
Intercept 3.5422  (0.0023)  3.3364 (0.0019) a -0.0518 b
Root mean squared error  0.2855  0.4215  0.2833  0.3420 b
Error degrees of freedom 1,340,697  1,870,554 1,415,775  5,234,086 b
R-squared  0.7466  0.2292  0.7364  0.5715 b
Sample size                                                    1,870,578                      1,870,578                      1,870,578                      5,305,108       b                      
Notes:  The projection method includes the variables for eliminating the firm effect (see Data Appendix for complete list) and is estimated
by least squares within person. The estimates from the projection method are the result of a multi-step process described in the text. (a)
Not separately calculated. (b) Pooled estimates of firm means, statistics apply to pooled men-w men equation.
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for Components of Log Real Total Compensation
by Sex for 1976 to 1987
                                                                                                                                    
    Men Women
Variable Definition                                                 Mean         Std Dev    Mean       Std Dev 
Log (Real annual compensation costs, 1980 IF) 4.3442  0.5187 4.0984  0.4801
Xb - Predicted value 0.4261 0.1383  0.3234 0.1120
q - Total individual effect 3.9160  0.4387  3.7776  0.3843
Sampling variance of q  0.2714  0.2758  0.3444  0.3299
a  -Individual effect not related to education  0.0000  0.3947  0.0000  0.3639
Sampling variance of a  0.1357 0.1379  0.1722  0.1649
uh -Individual effect related to education 3.9160  0.1915 3.7776  0.1238
Sampling variance of uh  0.1357  0.1379  0.1722  0.1649
y - Total firm effect  0.0028  0.0685  -0.0039  0.0566
Sampling variance of y 0.0019  0.0075  0.0020 0.0075
f - Firm-specific intercept  0.0031  0.1044 -0.0072 0.0969
Sampling variance of f 0.0137  1.8867  0.0065  0.1775
g1 -Firm-specific seniority slope -3.37e-05 0.0335 8.28e-04  0.0326
Sampling variance of g1 0.0009  0.0490  0.0009  0.0576
g2 - Firm-specific slope change at 10 years -5.36e-04  0.0542 -1.64e-03  0.0574
Sampling variance ofg2 0.0131  1.5672 0.0122 1.3563
e - Residual                                                             -0.0006       0.2328      0.0012       0.2417   
Notes: For sources and methods see the Data Appendix.
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Table 5
Summary Statistics for the Decomposition of Variance Using the Projection Method
for Individual Data, both Sexes, 1976-1987
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Simple Correlations with:
No. Variable Description                              Mean     StD               1             2             3             4             5             6             7             8             9           10        11
1 yit - log (real total compensation) 4.2575 0.5189 1.0000 0.3271 0.8401  0.7331  0.4143 0.2131  0.1303 0.0053 -0.0293 0.0276 0.4336
2 xitb - predicted effect: experience, 0.3899 0.1386  0.3271 1.0000  0.0710 -0.0267 0.2211 0.0325 0.0350 -0.0157 -0.0148 0.0077 -0.0048
region, year
3 qi -individual effect 3.8672 0.4255 0.8401 0.0710 1.0000 0.9027  0.4303  0.0974 0.0802 -0.0201 -0.0171  0.0203 -0.0243
4 ai -component of individual effect 0.0000  0.3841 0.7331 -0.0267  0.9027 1.0000 0.0000 0.0853 0.0763 -0.0242 -0.0186 0.0186 -0.0233
5 uih - component of individual  3.8672  0.1831 0.4143 0.2211 0.4303 0.0000 1.0000 0.0473 0 .0263 0.0041 -0.0006 0.0081 -0.0076
effect
6 yJ(i,t) - firm effect 0.0004  0.0647  0.2131 0.0325 0.0974 0.0853 0.0473 1.0000 0.4428 0.2089 -0.0909 0.0717 -0.0001
7 fJ(i,t) - component of firm effect -0.0005  0.1019  0.1303 0.0350 0.0802 0.0763 0.0263 0.4428 1.0000 -0.7844 -0.5625 0.2562 -0.0001
8 g1J(i,t)sJ(i,t)it+g2 J(i,t)T1(sJ(i,t)it-10) 0.0009  0.0935 0.0053 -0.0157 -0.0201 -0.0242 0.0041 0.2089 -0.7844 1.0000 0.5507 -0.2298 0.0000
- component
9  g1J(i,t) - slope on seniority 0.0003  0.0332 -0.0293 -0.0148 -0.0171 -0.0186 -0.0006 -0.0909 -0.5625 0.5507 1.0000 -0.2094 0.0000
10  g2J(i,t) - slope on seniority spline -0.0009  0.0553  0.0276 0.0077 0.0203  0.0186  0.0081  0.0717  0.2562  -0.2298 -0.2094 1.0000 0.0000
at 10 years
11          eit – residual                                0.0001    0.2360    0.4336  -0.0048  -0.0243  -0.0233  -0.0076  -0.0001  -0.0001   0.0000   0.0000    0.0000  1.0000
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For Table 6, the individuals were divided into three groups according to their a's. High- a
workers are much more likely to be observed in a single job (one employer) whereas low-a
workers are relatively more likely to have had three or more employers. High- a workers also
have more labor-force experience. Although a and f are positively correlated, low- f workers
are more likely to have had multiple employers. In particular the low-a low- f low experience
workers are the most likely to have had multiple employers. Table 7 examines the mobility of
high-a versus low-a workers explicitly. Persons with low estimated individual-effects are much
more likely to move between low- f jobs than are persons with high individual-effects (57%
versus 40%). Evidently the clean distinction between individual heterogeneity and firm
heterogeneity is called into question by this pattern. Do we estimate low a's because the
individual has moved through a sequence of low-  j bs or rather because some employers are
more likely to choose low-a workers, who are more mobile for a variety of reasons? Our
analysis does not provide a clear answer to this question.
Table 8 presents summary statistics for the sample of firms (weighted to be
representative of private industrial firms). Table 9 presents regression models for the logarithm
of real value added per employee, real sales per employee (measures of productivity) and
operating income as a proportion of total assets (a measure of performance). Using the
firm-level compensation policy measures generated by our projection method, we note that a
larger value of the predicted wage (xb-component) is associated with higher value-add d and
sales per worker and higher profitablity. A larger individual effect (a-component) is associated
with a substantially larger value-added per employee and sales per employee but not with
higher profitability. The part of the individual-effect related to education (uh-component) is
associated with higher value-added per worker but is not significant in the other two columns.
Higher firm-specific wages (f -component) are associated with higher productivity (value-added
per worker and sales per worker) and with higher profitability. Neither seniority slope is
associated with higher (or lower) productivity or profitability.
Table 10 presents the results for the relations among our compensation measures and a
variety of firm-level factor utilization rates.  Larger values of the xb-component of compensation
are associated with higher employment, capital, capital-labor ratio, professional employment
proportion and skilled employment proportion.  The a-component of the individual-effect is posi-
tively associated with total employment, total real capital, the capital-labor ratio and the
proportion of engineers, technical workers and managers in the work force, and is negatively
related to the shares of both skilled and unskilled workers.  Larger values of the average
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education effect are associated with higher total employment, total real capital and professional
proportion but lower values of the skilled proportion. The firm-specific intercept (f -component of
the firm effect) is strongly positively associated with total employment, total real capital and
capital intensity but is not associated with any components of the skill structure of the work
force.  Employment proporti ns are not related to this component of the firm effect in
compensation.  A high firm-specific seniority slope is positively associated with capital intensity
and slightly associated with the proportion of professional employees.
Table 11 presents a proportional hazards analysis of the relation between the survival of
firms and our estimated compensation components at the firm level. Both components of the
individual effect (a and the education part uh) increase survivorship in a statistically significant
manner. The effects related to firm-specific compensation factors are large but very imprecise.
The effect associated with the xb-component goes in the opposite direction.
Finally, Table 12 uses industry-level averages of the individual and firm specific
components of compensation to explain the industry-effect found in our raw individual data
(regression adjusted for labor force experience, region, year, education and sex) in the spirit of
Dickens and Katz (1987) and Krueger and Summers (1988). Since the right- and side variables
in this regression fully account for the industry effects in a statistical sense (R2 = 0.97), the
interesting question is the relative importance of individual heterogeneity (a-component of the
person effect) and firm heterogeneity (both f andg-components) as components of the industry
effects. The third through sixth columns of Table 12 present separate industry-level regressions
using first a alone (column 3 and 4) and then the three parts of the firm-effect by themselves
(columns 5 and 6). It is clear from the fact that a alone explains 92% of the inter-industry wage
variation, whereas the firm-specific components explain only 25%, that individual effects, as
measured statistically are more important than firm-co ponents. One should recall, however,
that in our example theoretical models structural firm and individual heterogeneity can influence
both of the statistical measures.
High Wage Workers and High Wage Firms                                                                                                                WP 94-27
Page 29
Table 6
Descriptive Statistics for Individual Level Variables
by a-Category and Number of Employers
for 1976 to 1987
                                                                                                                                              
     Low a      Middle a      High a
Variable Definition                                             Mean      Std Dev      Mean     Std Dev           Mean     Std Dev
1 Employer
Log (Real Annual Compensation Cost, 1980 FF) 3.859 0.476 4.221 0.302 4.673 0.438
Male 0.640 0.606 0.643
Total Labor Force Experience 15.496 11.861 17.122 12.341  23.826 12.236
xb - Predicted Value 0.385 0.142 0.378 0.137 0.372 0.0127
uh -Individual Effect Related to Education 3.872 0.202 3.845 0.165 3.879  0.183
y - Total Firm Effect 0.000 0.073 0.009 0.066 0.008 0.058
f - Firm-specific Intercept -0.004 0.110 0.011 0.109 0.014 0.114
e - Residual 0.007 0.213 -0.000 0.159 -0.005 0.179
Number of Observations 710,892 773,743 919,119
Percent of Observations in a Category 29.57% 32.19% 38.24%
2 Employers
Log (Real Annual Compensation Cost, 1980 FF) 3.903 0.458 4.209 0.314 4.611 0.433
Male 0.657 0.603 0.584
Total Labor Force Experience 12.678 10.242 14.244 11.034 19.694 11.760
xb - Predicted Value 0.392 0.143 0.386 0.139 0.389 0.125
uh -Individual Effect Related to Education 3.876  0.204 3.839 0.155 3.865 0.178
y - Total Firm Effect -0.009  0.064 -0.001 0.056 0.002 0.057
f - Firm-specific Intercept -0.014 0.092 -0.002 0.092 0.001 0.096
e - Residual 0.005 0.298 -0.002 0.197 -0.007 0.222
Number of Observations 460,275 494,574 458,772
Percent of Observations in a, Category 32.56% 34.99% 32.45%
3 or More Employers
Log (Real Annual Compensation Cost, 1980 FF) 3.949 0.467 4.235 0.364 4.644 0.478
Male 0.759 0.679 0.660
Total Labor Force Experience 11.488 8.751 12.695 9.745 17.518 10.926
xb - Predicted Value  0.414 0.149 0.405 0.147 0.413 0.132
uh -Individual Effect Related to Education 3.896 0.201 3.851 0.158 3.877 0.183
y - Total Firm Effect  -0.013 0.070 -0.005 0.063 0.001 0.068
f - Firm-specific Intercept -0.017 0.091 -0.007 0.088 -0.001 0.097
e - Residual 0.007 0.343 0.000 0.255 -0.007 0.275
Number of Observations 595,220 504,083 388,430
Percent of Observations in a, Category                 40.01%                        33.88%                        26.11%                 
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Table 7
Decomposition of Job Changes by a, Previous f, and New f
a Category: Low Middle High
a a a
f of New Employer: Low f    High f Total Low f    High f Total Low f    High f Total
f of Previous Employer:
Low f 57.1%  17.2%   74.3% 47.6%   19.5%  67.1% 39.5%   20.8%   60.3%
High f 17.8%    7.8%   25.7% 19.6%   13.3%  32.9% 20.3%   19.4%   39.8%
Total 75.0%  25.0% 100.0% 67.2%   32.8%100.0% 59.8% 40.2% 100.0%
Notes: Cutoff levels for a were -0.1394 and 0.1196. The cutoff level for f was -0.000497. There were 362,686 transitions of Low a,
workers, 277,153 transitions of Middle a, workers and 205,748 transitions of High a workers.
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Table 8
Summary Statistics for Firms
Annual Averages over the Life of the Firm
(weighted by inverse sampling probability, 1978-1988)
                                                                                                                                    
Variable Definition                                                                  Mean             Std Dev           
Average xb of employees at the firm 0.3906 0.2420
Average a of employees at the firm -0.0549 0.6446
Average uh of employees at the firm 3.8503 0.2836
Firm-specific wage premium -0.0196 0.2707
g1 - Firm-specific seniority slope 0.0027 0.0775
g2  - Change in seniority slope at 10 years -0.0031 0.1728
Number of employees sampled at firm 34.2950 610.4800
Employment at December 31st (thousands) 0.1097 1.6789
Real total assets (millions IF 1980) 59.4769 3,938.9800
Operating Income/Total Assets  0.1254 0.4544
Value-added/Total Assets 1.0051 1.8889
Real total compensation (millions FF 1980) 1.3260 2.3570
Real value added/Employee (thou. IF 1980) 106.7672 936.5212
Real total assets/Employee (thou. FF 1980) 363.0707 21,067.5500
(Engineers, Professionals and Managers)/Employee 0.2362 0.4072
Skilled workers/Employee 0.5414  0.5255
Log(Real total assets) 1.7711 3.3558
Log(Real value added/Employee) 4.5215 1.1050
Log(Real sales/Employee) 5.5673 2.0139
Log(Total employment at December 31) -3.0262 2.1109
Log(Real capital/Employee) 4.7972 2.2710
Age of firm (N=7,385) 19.5023 23.0331
Number of firms                                                                        14,717                                    
Notes: For sources and definitions, see the Data Appendix.
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Table 9
Generalized Least Squares Estimates of the Relation Between
Productivity, Profitability and Compensation Policies
                                                                                                                                                                                      
                        Dependent variable:     Log (VAdded/Worker)          Log(Sales/Employee)           Operating Inc./Capital                     
  Standard  Standard  Standard
Independent Variable                                Coefficient          Error           Coefficient         Error            Coefficient            Error           
Average predicted wage (xb) 0.6057 (0.0310) 0.4833 (0.0494) 0.0569 (0.0161)
Average individual effect (a) 0.2617  (0.0118) 0.1623 (0.0188)  0.0102 (0.0061)
Average education effect (uh) 0.0725 (0.0275) -0.0674 (0.0437) -0.0036 (0.0143)
Firm-specific intercept (f) 0.1240 (0.0343) 0.1128 (0.0546) 0.0415 (0.0179)
Firm-specific seniority slope (g1) 0.1492 (0.1195) 0.2852 (0.1902) 0.0571 (0.0623)
Change in slope (g2) -0.0485 (0.0428) -0.1107 (0.0681) -0.0264 (0.0223)
(Engineers, Tech., Managers)/Employee 0.6815 (0.0247) 0.8989 (0.0394)  -0.1267 (0.0126)
(Skilled Workers)/Employee 0.2167 (0.0190) 0.4979 (0.0302)  0.0094 (0.0099)
Log(Capital/Employee) 0.1017 (0.0025) 0.2290 (0.0039
Intercept                                                       4.3985            (0.1126)           2.9784            (0.1791)           0.1664            (0.0586)        
Note: Models were estimated using 14,717 firms with complete data. All regressions included 2-digit industry effects. All sources are
discussed in the Data Appendix.
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Table 10
Generalized Least Squares Estimates of the Relation Between Factors and Compensation Policies
                                                                                                                                                                                      
                                                                                                                  Dependent Variable                                              
Log(Empl- Log(Real Log(Capital  EPM  Skilled W     Unskilled W
Independent Variable                                        oyees)           Capital)          /Employee)   /Employee       /Employee     /Employee 
Average predicted effect (xb) 0.2541 1.0205 0.7665 0.1142 0.0628 -0.1770
(0.0724) (0.1036) (0.0638) (0.0117)  (0.0150) (0.0142)
Average a in firm 0.2764 0.7454 0.4690 0.1231 -0.0316 -0.0914
(0.0273) (0.0391) (0.0241) (0.0043) (0.0055) (0.0052)
Average uh in firm 0.3478 0.4076 0.0598 0.3307 -0.0964 -0.2343
(0.0643)  (0.0921) (0.0567) (0.0101) (0.0129) (0.0122)
Firm-specific f 0.3748 0.7618 0.3869 0.0057 -0.0052 -0.0005
(0.0802) (0.1148) (0.0707) (0.0131) (0.0167) (0.0158)
Firm-specific g1 -0.0262 0.5277 0.5539 0.0835 -0.0303 -0.0532
(0.2798) (0.4005) (0.2467) (0.0456) (0.0582) (0.0553)
Firm-specific g2 0.0011 0.0497 0.0486 -0.0314 0.0140 0.0174
(Engi., Tech., Managers)/Employee -0.10081 2.0038 2.1219 (0.0164) (0.0209)  (0.0198)
(0.0568) (0.0812) (0.0500)
(Skilled Workers)/Employee  -0.2947 0.0707 0.3654
(0.0445) (0.0637) (0.0392)
Intercept -3.4129 3.0371 6.4499 -0.8485 0.8309 1.0176
                                                                      (0.2630)         (0.3765)         (0.2319)         (0.0423)          (0.0539)        (0.0512)   
Notes: The models were estimated using the 14,717 firms with complete data. All equations include a set of two-industry effects.
Sources and methods are discussed in the Data Appendix. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 11
Proportional Hazards Estimates of the Relation between Firm Survival
and Compensation Policies
                                                                                                                                    
  Parameter    Standard         Risk
Independent Variable                                           Estimate           Error                Ratio       
Average predicted effect (xb) 2.0751 (0.6241) 7.9650
Average a in firm -0.5327 (0.2064) 0.5870
Average uh in firm -1.8615  (0.5398) 0.1550
Firm-specific f -0.5909  (0.5356) 0.5540
Firm-specific g1 1.6497  (2.4598) 5.2050
Firm-specific g2 0.3592 (0.6677) 1.4320
(Eng., Tech., Managers)/Employee 0.4096 (0.3699) 1.5060
(Skilled Workers)/Employee                                      0.3372            (0.2926)            1.4010      
Notes: Negative coefficients indicate a reduced probability of firm death. This model was
estimated using the 7,382 firms with known birth dates. The model includes two-digit industry
effects.
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Table 12
Generalized Least Squares Estimates of the Relation between Industry Wage
Effects and Industry Averages of Firm-specific Compensation Policies
                                                                                                                                                                                      
 Standard Standard Standard
Independent Variable                                      Coefficient        Error             Coefficient       Error            Coefficient        Error     
Industry average xp -0.5123 (0.0116)
Industry average a 0.7505 (0.0025) 0.8324 (0.0017)
Industry average urj 0.3947 (0.0096)
CID Industry average f 0.3350 (0.0153) -0.6659  (0.0150)
Industry average g1 0.8726 (0.1359) -18.2220 (0.1256)
Industry average g2 1.8595 (0.1011) 2.9917  (0.0979)
Intercept 1.7854 (0.0339) 3.1088 (0.0019) 3.0687 (0.0019)
R2                                                                   0.9664                                     0.9213                                     0.2486                           
Notes: The dependent variable is the 83 industry-effects estimated by least squares controlling for labor force experience (through
quartic), region, year, education (eight categories) and sex (fully interacted). The independent variables are the industry averages for
the indicated firm-specific compensation policy. The time period is 1976-198 .
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5  Conclusions
In all likelihood, our analysis of the separate effects of individual and firm heterogeneity
on wage rates and on firm compensation policies has raised more new questions than it has
resolved. We find that individual-effects are a significant component of real total annual
compensation variation. Firm-effects, while also important, are not as important as
individual-effects. Firm-level heterogeneity and individual-level heterogeneity are not highly
correlated; however, mobility patterns suggest that the distinction between an individual-effect
and a firm-effect is not economically simple. Firms that hire high-wage workers appear to be
more productive per worker but not more profitable. High-wage firms-those paying higher wages
controlling for the individual heterogeneity of the employees-are more productive per worker and
are more profitable. Both sources of wage rate heterogeneity-high-wage workers and high-wage
firms-are associated with more capital intensive firms. We also estimated firm-level
heterogeneity in the returns to seniority. This component of wage variation is decidedly less
important in our sample than the two pure heterogeneity components. We believe that our
results provide the statistical basis upon which to begin the process of testing the relevance of
agency, efficiency wage, search/ matching, and endogeneous mobility models as potential
explanations for compensation outcome heterogeneity.
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A Data Appendix
A.1 Description of the DAS
The Declarations Annuelles des Salaires are a large collection of matched
employer-employee information generated by INSEE (Institut National de la Statistique et des
Etudes Economiques). The data cover all individuals employed in French enterprises who were
born in October of evennumbered years, with civil servants excluded.14  Our extract runs from
1976 through 1987, with 1981 and 1983 excluded because the underlying administrative data
were not sampled in those years. The initial data set contained 7,416,422 observations. Each
observation corresponds to a unique establishment-individual-year combination. The
observation includes an identifier that corresponds to the employee (called ID below), an
identifier that corresponds to the establishment (SIRET) and an identifier that corresponds to the
parent enterprise of the establishment (SIREN). We have information on the number of days the
individual worked in the establishment, as well as the full- ime/part- ime status of the employee.
This allows us to aggregate all of the establishments in which an individual worked in a given
year, and thus not treat changes of establishment within the same enterprise as if they were
changes of employer. Each observation also includes, in addition to the variables listed above,
the sex, month, year and place of birth, occupation, total net nominal earnings during the year
and annualized gross nominal earnings during the year for the individual, as well as the location
and industry of the employing establishment.
A.2 Observation selection, variable creation and missng data imputation
A.2.1 Aggregation of establishments
The creation of the analysis data set involved the selection of desired indiv duals, the
aggregation of establishment-level data to the enterprise level, and the construction of the
variables of interest from the variables already in the data set. We selected only full-time
employees (sample reduced to 5,966,620 observations). We then created a single observation
for each IDyear-SIREN combination by aggregating within ID and year over SIRETs in the same
SIREN. For each ID-year-SIREN, we summed total net nominal earnings and total days worked
over all SIRETs. We used the occupation, location and industry that corresponded to the
establishment in which the individual worked the largest number of days during the year. This
                                                 
14 Heron (1988) shows that individuals employed in the civil service move almost exclusively to other positions within
the civil service. Thus the exclusion of civil servants should not affect our estimation of a worker's market wage equation.
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reduced the number of observations to 5,965,256. We then selected the enterprise at which the
individual had worked the largest number of days during that year (sample reduced to 5,497,287
observations). The aggregation of total number of days worked across all establishments
occasionally yielded observations for which the total number of days worked was greater than
360 (the maximum permitted). In these cases, we just truncated days worked at 360. We then
calculated an annualized net nominal earnings for the ID-year SIREN combination. We
eliminated all years of data for individuals who were younger than 15 years old or older than 65
years old at the date of their first appearance in the data set (sample reduced to 5,325,413
observations).
A.2.2 Total compensation costs
The dependent variable in our wage rate analysis is the annualized real total
compensation cost of the employee (LFRAISRE). To convert the annualized net nominal
earnings to total compensation costs, we used the tax rules and computer programs provided
by the Division Revenus at INSEE (J.L. Lheritier, private communication) to compute both the
employee and employer share of all mandatory payroll taxes (cotisations et charges salariales
employe et employeur) Total annualized compensation cost is defined as the sum of annualized
net nominal earnings, employee payroll taxes and employer payroll taxes. Nominal values were
then deflated by a consumer price index to get real annualized net earnings, and real
annualized total compensation cost. We eliminated 61 observations with zero values for
annualized total compensation cost (remaining sample 5,325,352).
A.2.3 Education and Total Labor Market Experience
Our initial DAS file did not contain education information. We used suppl mentary
information available for 10% of the DAS, (EDP, Echantillon Demographique Permanent) to
impute the level of education of all individuals in the DAS.15 The EDP includes information on
the highest degree obtained. There were 38 possible responses, including "no known degree."
These responses were grouped into 8 degree-lev l categories as shown in table 1. Using these
eight categories and data available in the DAS, we ran separate ordered logits for men and
women to estimate coefficients used to impute education for the individuals in the DAS who are
not part of the EDP. EDP sample statistics for the men are in table 2, and those for the women
are in table 3. The estimated logit equations are in table 4 for men and table 5 for women.
                                                                                                                                                    
15 Access to the EDP is particularly difficult to obtain due to privacy regulations.
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Table 1: Degree Categories
Category Degree U.S. Equivalent
1 Sans Aucun Diplome No Terminal Degree
2 CEP Elementary School
DFEO
3 BEPC Junior High School
BE
BEPS
4 BAC (not F, G or H) High School
 Brevet superieur
CFES
5 CAP Vocational-Technical School (Basic)
BEP
EFAA
BAA
BPA
FPA ler
6 BP Vocational-Technical School (Advanced)
BEA
BEC
BEH
BEI
BES
BATA
BAC F
BAC G
BAC H
7 Sante Technical College and
BTS Undergraduate University
DUT
DEST
DEUL
DEUS
DEUG
8 2eme cycle Graduate School and Other
3eme cycle Post-Secondary Education
Grande ecole
CAPES
CAPET
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Table 2: EDP Sample Statistics - Men (Std. Deviations in Parentheses)
Variable Degree Category
Name Overall 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
DOBi < 1924 0.188 0.254 0.295 0.160 0.136 0.055 0.098 0.063 0.186
(0.391) (0.435) (0.456) (0.367) (0.343) (0.228) (0.297) (0.243) (0.389)
1925 < DOBi < 1929 0.056 0.062 0.085 0.042 0.049 0.034 0.048 0.026 0.065
(0.230) (0.242) (0.279) (0.200) (0.215) (0.180) (0.214) (0.158) (0.247)
1930 < DOBi < 1934 0.097 0.109 0.120 0.067 0.068 0.081 0.095 0.054 0.101
(0.296) (0.311) (0.325) (0.250) (0.252) (0.273) (0.293) (0.226) (0.301)
1935 < DOBi < 1939 0.061 0.056 0.070 0.048 0.048 0.063 0.079 0.047 0.078
(0.240) (0.229) (0.255) (0.214) (0.215) (0.244) (0.270) (0.212) (0.268)
1940 < DOBi < 1944 0.094 0.070 0.091 0.075 0.098 0.117 0.133 0.118 0.149
(0.292) (0.256) (0.287) (0.264) (0.298) (0.322) (0.340) (0.323) (0.356)
1945 < DOBi < 1949 0.102 0.064 0.097 0.099 0.130 0.130 0.152 0.175 0.164
(0.302) (0.244) (0.296) (0.299) (0.336) (0.336) (0.359) (0.380) (0.370)
1950 < DOBi < 1954 0.159 0.095 0.132 0.166 0.245 0.224 0.217 0.288 0.201
(0.365) (0.293) (0.339) (0.372) (0.430) (0.417) (0.412) (0.453) (0.401)
1955 < DOBi < 1959 0.101 0.072 0.060 0.182 0.157 0.145 0.110 0.176 0.054
(0.302) (0.259) (0.238) (0.386) (0.364) (0.352) (0.313) (0.381) (0.226)
1960 < DOBi < 1976 0.141 0.218 0.050 0.160 0.069 0.151 0.068 0.052 0.003
(0.348) (0.413) (0.218) (0.367) (0.253) (0.358) (0.251) (0.224) (0.056)
Works in Ile de France 0.232 0.204 0.226 0.288 0.352 0.187 0.284 0.309 0.457
(0.422) (0.403) (0.418) (0.453) (0.478) (0.390) (0.451) (0.462) (0.498)
CSP62 0.263 0.357 0.282 0.188 0.157 0.199 0.145 0.184 0.105
(0.440) (0.479) (0.450) (0.391) (0.364) (0.399) (0.352) (0.387) (0.307)
C SP61 0.225 0.231 0.255 0.117 0.071 0.299 0.186 0.096 0.058
(0.418) (0.422) (0.436) (0.321) (0.266) (0.458) (0.390) (0.295) (0.233)
C SP50 0.151 0.118 0.166 0.279 0.279 0.108 0.203 0.235 0.203
(0.358) (0.322) (0.372) (0.448) (0.448) (0.310) (0.402) (0.424) (0.402)
C SP40 0.112 0.061 0.110 0.173 0.233 0.080 0.258 0.275 0.225
(0.315) (0.240) (0.314) (0.379) (0.423) (0.272) (0.438) (0.447) (0.418)
CSP30 0.043 0.020 0.025 0.053 0.147 0.015 0.057 0.080 0.359
0.203 0.142 0.157 (0.224) 0.354 0.121 (0.232) 0.271 0.480
Number of Observations71229 26236 12825 3847 3036 16489 3878 2387 2531
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Table 3: E DP Sample Statistics - Women (Std. Deviations in Parenthes)
Variable Degree Category
Name Overall 1 2 3 4 6 6 7 8
DOBi < 1924 0.152 0.235 0.206 0.129 0.055 0.034 0.042 0.055 0.056
(0.359) (0.424) (0.405) (0.336) (0.229) (0.181) (0.202) (0.228) (0.230)
1925 < DOBi < 1929 0.047 0.053 0.078 0.045 0.025 0.024 0.017 0.022 0.023
(0.212) (0.224) (0.268) (0.206) (0.156) (0.153) (0.130) (0.146) (0.148)
1930 < DOBi < 1934 0.084 0.096 0.118 0.070 0.043 0.061 0.054 0.049 0.052
(0.278) (0.294) (0.322) (0.255) (0.203) (0.239) (0.226) (0.216) (0.222)
1935 < DOBi < 1939 0.054 0.056 0.069 0.047 0.036 0.050 0.045 0.038 0.047
(0.226) (0.229) (0.254) (0.211) (0.185) (0.218) (0.208) (0.190) (0.212)
1940 < DOBi < 1944 0.093 0.070 0.113 0.086 0.090 0.103 0.108 0.101 0.127
(0.290) (0.255) (0.317) (0.281) (0.287) (0.304) (0.311) (0.301) (0.334)
1945 < DOBi < 1949 0.114 0.077 0.125 0.109 0.116 0.135 0.164 0.156 0.209
(0.317) (0.267) (0.331) (0.311) (0.321) (0.341) (0.371) (0.363) (0.407)
1950 < DOBi < 1954 0.186 0.112 0.180 0.167 0.285 0.247 0.252 0.298 0.354
(0.389) (0.315) (0.384) (0.373) (0.451) (0.431) (0.434) (0.457) (0.478)
1955 < DOBi < 1959 0.120 0.078 0.067 0.178 0.217 0.166 0.169 0.223 0.125
(0.325) (0.267) (0.251) (0.383) (0.412) (0.372) (0.375) (0.416) (0.331)
1960 < DOBi < 1976 0.150 0.224 0.043 0.170 0.133 0.180 0.147 0.059 0.008
(0.357) (0.417) (0.202) (0.375) (0.339) (0.384) (0.355) (0.236) (0.088)
Works in Ile de France 0.254 0.237 0.239 0.286 0.333 0.221 0.316 0.283 0.466
(0.435) (0.425) (0.426) (0.452) (0.471) (0.415) (0.465) (0.451) (0.499)
CSP62 0.227 0.343 0.296 0.108 0.079 0.126 0.073 0.061 0.053
(0.419) (0.475) (0.456) (0.310) (0.270) (0.331) (0.259) (0.240) (0.224)
CSP61 0.050 0.061 0.067 0.027 0.023 0.044 0.027 0.029 0.015
(0.218) (0.239) (0.249) (0.163) (0.150) (0.205) (0.161) (0.168) (0.120)
CSP50 0.458 0.365 0.427 0.596 0.570 0.539 0.630 0.420 0.511
(0.498) (0.482) (0.495) (0.491) (0.495) (0.498) (0.483) (0.494) (0.500)
CSP40 0.073 0.040 0.035 0.090 0.165 0.045 0.097 0.350 0.214
(0.261) (0.195) (0.185) (0.286) (0.371) (0.208) (0.296) (0.477) (0.410)
CSP30 0.013 0.008 0.005 0.016 0.048 0.005 0.009 0.032 0.150
0.115 0.090 0.068 0.125 0.214 0.071 0.093 0.176 0.357
Number of
Observations
57677 19822 12768 4760 3112 10388 2633 3173 1021
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Table 4: Degree Category Model Coefficients-Men
Degree Variable Coefficient Std. Err.
1 Intercept 6.254 0.122
1925  <  Date of Birth  <1929 -0.496 0.105
1930  <  Date of Birth  <1934 -0.493 0.090
1935  <  Date of Birth  <1939 -1.234 0.100
1940  <  Date of Birth  <1944 -2.031 0.085
1945  <  Date of Birth  <1949 -2.818 0.085
1950  <  Date of Birth  <1954 -3.388 0.086
1955  <  Date of Birth  <1959 -2.289 0.113
1960  <  Date of Birth  <1976 1.897 0.360
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -0.850 0.116
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -0.904 0.132
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -2.758 0.111
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -4.028 0.117
Manager at Date tin Firm J(i, t) -5.892 0.124
Works in Ile de France -0.627 0.048
2 Intercept 5.828 0.125
1925  <  Date of Birth  <1929 -0.320 0.106
1930  <  Date of Birth  <1934 -0.518 0.091
1935  <  Date of Birth  <1939 -1.117 0.102
1940  <  Date of Birth  <1944 -1.863 0.087
1945  <  Date of Birth  <1949 -2.430 0.087
1950  <  Date of Birth  <1954 -3.248 0.089
1955  <  Date of Birth  <1959 -2.649 0.119
1960  <  Date of Birth  <1976 0.246 0.363
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -1.311 0.119
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -1.074 0.135
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -2.635 0.114
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -3.740 0.121
Manager at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -5.996 0.132
Works in Ile de France -0.629 0.050
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Degree Variable Coefficient Std. Err.
3 Intercept 2.465 0.134
1925 < Date of Birth <1929 -0.333 0.131
1930 < Date of Birth <1934 -0.344 0.112
1935 < Date of Birth <1939 -0.667 0.124
1940 < Date of Birth <1944 -1.120 0.105
1945 < Date of Birth <1949 -1.307 0.102
1950 < Date of Birth <1954 -1.373 0.100
1955 < Date of Birth <1959 0.074 0.123
1960 < Date of Birth <1976 2.891 0.364
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -0.681 0.126
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -0.557 0.144
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -0.944 0.118
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -1.610 0.127
Manager at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -3.400 0.142
Works in Ile de France -0.410 0.057
4 Intercept 0.803 0.142
1925 < Date of Birth <1929 0.005 0.133
1930 < Date of Birth <1934 -0.109 0.117
1935 < Date of Birth <1939 -0.325 0.130
1940 < Date of Birth <1944 -0.381 0.106
1945 < Date of Birth <1949 -0.379 0.104
1950 < Date of Birth <1954 -0.069 0.101
1955 < Date of Birth <1959 0.830 0.127
1960 < Date of Birth <1976 2.855 0.369
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -0.193 0.134
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -0.294 0.156
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -0.217 0.125
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i,t) -0.377 0.132
Manager at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -1.311 0.136
Works in Ile de France -0.265 0.057
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Degree Variable Coefficient Std. Err.
5 Intercept 3.985 0.125
1925 < Date of Birth <1929 0.392 0.113
1930 < Date of Birth <1934 0.734 0.096
1935 < Date of Birth <1939 0.446 0.105
1940 < Date of Birth <1944 0.090 0.089
1945 < Date of Birth <1949 -0.336 0.089
1950 < Date of Birth <1954 0.700 0.090
1955 < Date of Birth <1959 0.230 0.116
1960 < Date of Birth <1976 3.319 0.362
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -1.306 0.116
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -0.340 0.131
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -2.494 0.110
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -3.011 0.117
Manager at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -5.195 0.131
Works in Ile de France -0.766 0.049
6 Intercept 1.714 0.139
1925 < Date of Birth <1929 0.266 0.132
1930 < Date of Birth <1934 0.471 0.111
1935 < Date of Birth <1939 0.318 0.119
1940 < Date of Birth <1944 0.000 0.102
1945 < Date of Birth <1949 -0.216 0.102
1950 < Date of Birth <1954 -0.363 0.103
1955 < Date of Birth <1959 0.312 0.130
1960 < Date of Birth <1976 2.742 0.368
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -0.849 0.129
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -0.006 0.142
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -1.100 0.121
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -1.030 0.126
Manager at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -3.036 0.141
Works in Ile de France -0.510 0.056
High Wage Workers and High Wage Firms                                                                                                                WP 94-27
Page 45
Degree Variable Coefficient Std. Err.
7 Intercept -0.141 0.158
1925 < Date of Birth <1929 0.102 0.179
1930 < Date of Birth <1934 0.407 0.145
1935 < Date of Birth <1939 0.349 0.154
1940 < Date of Birth <1944 0.519 0.126
1945 < Date of Birth <1949 0.653 0.123
1950 < Date of Birth <1954 0.843 0.121
1955 < Date of Birth <1959 1.704 0.145
1960 < Date of Birth <1976 3.339 0.379
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -0.155 0.136
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -0.055 0.157
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -0.437 0.129
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -0.100 0.134
Manager at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -1.648 0.148
Works in Ile de France -0.399 0.062
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Table 5: Degree Category Model Coefficients-Women
Degree Variable Coefficient Std. Err.
1 Intercept 7.296 0.205
1925 < Date of Birth <1929 -0.723 0.257
1930 < Date of Birth <1934 -0.999 0.199
1935 < Date of Birth <1939 -1.393 0.206
1940 < Date of Birth <1944 -2.328 0.169
1945 < Date of Birth <1949 -3.023 0.161
1950 < Date of Birth <1954 -3.791 0.156
1955 < Date of Birth <1959 -3.082 0.172
1960 < Date of Birth <1976 1.070 0.382
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -0.205 0.195
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -0.634 0.295
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -2.250 0.144
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -3.853 0.161
Manager at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -5.449 0.191
Works in Ile de France -0.925 0.069
2 Intercept 7.148 0.206
1925 _< Date of Birth _< 1929 -0.224 0.257
1930 _< Date of Birth _< 1934 -0.683 0.200
1935 _< Date of Birth _< 1939 -1.073 0.207
1940 _< Date of Birth _< 1944. -1.743 0.169
1945 _< Date of Birth _< 1949 -2.429 0.161
1950 <_ Date of Birth <_ 1954 -3.433 0.157
1955 _< Date of Birth <_ 1959 -3.323 0.175
1960 <_ Date of Birth _< 1976 -0.673 0.384
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -0.787 0.196
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -0.977 0.296
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -2.466 0.146
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -4.352 0.165
Manager at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -6.431 0.216
Works in Ile de France -0.983 0.070
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Degree Variable Coefficient Std. Err.
3 Intercept 4.645 0.211
1925 < Date of Birth <1929 -0.307 0.265
1930 < Date of Birth <1934 -0.742 0.207
1935 < Date of Birth <1939 -1.021 0.217
1940 < Date of Birth <1944 -1.550 0.177
1945 < Date of Birth <1949 -2.011 0.167
1950 < Date of Birth <1954 -2.537 0.162
1955 < Date of Birth <1959 -1.409 0.176
1960 < Date of Birth <1976 1.506 0.385
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -0.778 0.202
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -0.840 0.308
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -1.218 0.149
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -2.379 0.166
Manager at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -3.977 0.209
Works in Ile de France -0.738 0.074
4 Intercept 2.263 0.223
1925 < Date of Birth <1929 0.023 0.285
1930 < Date of Birth <1934 -0.314 0.225
1935 < Date of Birth <1939 -0.383 0.233
1940 < Date of Birth <1944 -0.542 0.189
1945 < Date of Birth <1949 -0.894 0.180
1950 < Date of Birth <1954 -0.694 0.172
1955 < Date of Birth <1959 0.075 0.187
1960 < Date of Birth <1976 2.448 0.390
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -0.248 0.210
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -0.167 0.320
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -0.502 0.154
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -0.880 0.169
Manager at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -1.725 0.193
Works in Ile de France -0.462 0.076
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Degree Variable Coefficient Std. Err.
5 Intercept 4.555 0.211
1925 < Date of Birth <1929 0.391 0.267
1930 < Date of Birth <1934 0.441 0.208
1935 < Date of Birth <1939 0.371 0.214
1940 < Date of Birth <1944 -0.057 0.177
1945 < Date of Birth <1949 -0.529 0.168
1950 < Date of Birth <1954 -1.022 0.163
1955 < Date of Birth <1959 -0.342 0.178
1960 < Date of Birth <1976 2.753 0.385
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -0.898 0.196
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -0.645 0.297
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -1.593 0.144
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -3.272 0.162
Manager at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -5.147 0.218
Works in Ile de France -0.967 0.070
6 Intercept 2.693 0.231
1925 < Date of Birth <1929 -0.148 0.309
1930 < Date of Birth <1934 0.111 0.233
1935 < Date of Birth <1939 0.054 0.241
1940 < Date of Birth <1944 -0.210 0.199
1945 < Date of Birth <1949 -0.461 0.189
1950 < Date of Birth <1954 -0.927 0.184
1955 < Date of Birth <1959 -0.264 0.199
1960 < Date of Birth <1976 2.531 0.396
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -0.969 0.212
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -0.675 0.320
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -1.008 0.153
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -2.062 0.174
Manager at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -4.133 0.272
Works in Ile de France -0.541 0.078
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Degree Variable Coefficient Std. Err.
7 Intercept 2.278 0.223
1925 < Date of Birth <1929 -0.137 0.289
1930 < Date of Birth <1934 -0.201 0.224
1935 < Date of Birth <1939 -0.361 0.233
1940 < Date of Birth <1944 -0.439 0.189
1945 < Date of Birth <1949 -0.552 0.178
1950 < Date of Birth <1954 -0.601 0.173
1955 < Date of Birth <1959 0.153 0.187
1960 < Date of Birth <1976 1.638 0.395
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -0.511 0.213
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) 0.064 0.315
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -0.749 0.155
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -0.047 0.166
Manager at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -2.052 0.201
Works in Ile de France -0.738 0.077
With these estimated coefficients, we were able to calculate the probability that a given
individual would have a degree in a particular category. We used the data corresponding to the
earliest date that an individual appeared in our sample to calculate these probabilities. The
probability that a given individual i h s a degree in category n was calculated as follows. For all
În~  {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}, let
( )nini XPRE ~~ exp b= ,
where Xi = represents the vector of covariates for individual  and 
n~b  corresponds to the vector
of coefficients for degrees of category n~. Let
å
=
=
7
1~
~
n
n
ii PREPRE .
Now, if n Î {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7},
P(degree categoryi = n) = 
i
n
i
PRE
PRE
+1
and if n = 8,
P(degree categoryi = 8) = 1 - å
=
7
1~n
P (degree categoryi = n~) .
We used this degree category (actual, where possible, otherwise imputed) for all
observations on the individual.
To calculate school leaving age we used table 14 in CEREQ-DEP-INSEE (1990), which
provides the average age of termination for each French diploma separately for men and
women in 1986. Using the probability of each degree category and the average school-leaving
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age for degrees in that category (the ages were fairly homogeneous within categories), we
calculated expected school-leaving age.
A.2.4 Job Seniority and Total Labor Market Experience
Individuals fell into two categories with respect to the calculation of job seniority
(employer-specific experience): those for whom the first year of observation was 1976 and
those who first appeared after 1976. For those individuals whose first observation was in 1976,
we estimated the expected length of the in-progress employment spell by a regression analysis
using a supplementary survey, the 1978 Enquete sur la Structure des Salaires (ESS, Salary
Structure Survey). In this survey, respondent establishments provided information on seniority
(in 1978), occupation, date of birth, industry, and work location for a scientific sample of their
employees. Using the ESS information, we estimated separate regressions for men and women
to predict seniority in 1976. The coefficients from these regressions were used to calculate
expected job seniority in 1976 for DAS individuals whose first observation was in 1976. The
dependent variable in the supplementary ESS regressions was current seniority with the
employer and the explanatory variables were date of birth (DOB), occupation (CSP, 1-digit),
region of employment (metropolitan Paris), and industry (NAP 100, approximately 2-digit).16
Table 6 provides sample statistics for the ESS data. Results of these regressions are shown in
equations 33 for men and 34 for women.
                                                 
16 The excluded categories were: 1960 < DOBi, CSP62 (1 if i is an Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in firm J(i,t)),
and N89 (1 if firm J(i, t) is in industry 89, Financial Organizations). The coefficients on the industry indicators are not shown
below.
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seniorityi,t,J(i,t)   = 2.513
(0.081)
+14.151 [DOBi < 1924] +12.820 [1925 < DOBi < 1929]
(0.067) (0.067)
+10.299 [1930 < DOBi < 1934] +7.445 [1935 < DOBi < 1939]
(0.066) (0.067)
+4.748 [1940 < DOBi < 1944] +2.569 [1945 < DOBi < 1949]
(0.067)  (0.065)
+0.612 [1950 < DOBi < 1954] -0.642 [1955 <DOBi < 1959]
(0.065) (0.067)
+4.039 CSP30i,t,J(i,t) + 4.939 CSP402,t,j(i,t)
(0.038) (0.031)
+1.885 CSP50i,t,J(i,t) + 2.898 CSP612,t,j(=,t)
(0.037) (0.027)
-0.958 Ile de Francei,t,J(i,t)
(0.026)
N = 547,746
 R2 = 0.461
(33)
seniorityi,t,J(i,t)   = 2.114
(0.084)
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+12.669 [DOB <1924] +11.014 [1925 < DOBi < 1929)
(0.074) (0.075)
+8.979 [1930 < DOBi < 1934) +7.278 [1935 < DOBi < 1939]
(0.073) (0.074)
+5.989 [1940 < DOBi < 1944] +4.604 [1945 < DOBi < 1949]
(0.075) (0.070)
+2.822 [1950 < DOBi < 1954] +0.641 [1955 < DOBi < 1959]
(0.068) (0.068)
+5.116 CSP30i,t,J(i,t) +5.789 CSP402i,t,J(i,t)
(0.082) (0.057)
+1.442 CSP50i,t,J(i,t) +2.429 CSP612i,t,J(i,t)
(0.037) (0.054)
-0.988 Ile de Francei,t,J(i,t)
(0.031)
N = 260,580
 R2 = 0.373
(34)
where
                   DOBi = Date of Birth of Individual i
CSP30i,t,J(i,t)  = 1 if i is a Engineer, Professional or Manager
CSP40i,t,J(i,t)  = 1 if i is Technician or Technical White-Collar
CSP50i,t,J(i,t)  = 1 if i is any other White-Collar
CSP61i,t,J(i,t)  = 1 if i is a Skilled Blue-Collar
CSP62i,t,J(i,t)  = 1 if i is an Unskilled Blue-Collar
 Ile de Francei,t,J(i,t)  = 1 if the establishment is in Ile-de-France.
(35)
We used these results to impute levels of job seniority in 1976 for the left-censor d DAS
individuals first observed in 1976. If the individual was left-censored and the imputed job
seniority was negative, we set job seniority prior to 1976 to zero. If the individual was first
observed after 1976, we assumed that job seniority prior to the date of the first DAS observation
for the individual was zero. If the age at the date of any observation (1976 or otherwise) was
less than the expected school-leaving age, both total labor force experience and prior job
seniority were set to zero. In all other cases (when the age was greater than the expected
school-leaving age), we calculated total labor market experience and job seniority as follows. If
the observation was the earliest appearance of the individual in our data, we set job seniority
equal to job seniority up to the date of the first observation plus the number of days worked for
that enterprise in the year of the first observation, divided by 360 and we set total labor market
experience to the current age less the school-leaving age. If the observation was not the first for
the individual but there was an observation in the previous year for the person17, we added 1 to
                                                 
17 The structure of our database is such that this condition (observations for individual i at both t and t - 1) could only
fail to be satisfied under 3 conditions. The first is that the individual was employed in the civil service in the intervening years.
The second is that the individual was unemployed for an entire calendar year. The third is that t = 1982 or t = 1984, since we
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total labor market experience. If the individual was employed for the majority of the current year
by the same enterprise that employed him or her for the majority of the previous year, i.e.
SIRENt = SIRENt-1, we added 1 to the level of seniority at  - 1. If SIRENt ¹  SIRENt-1, we set
seniority equal to the number of days worked divided by 360.
If, on the other hand, there was no observation in the previous year, we distinguished
between t = 1982 or t = 1984 and other years. When t ¹ 1982 or 1984, total labor market
experience was increased by 1 (reflecting experience gained in the year of the observation). If
the current SIREN and the most recent previous SIREN were the same, we added the number
of days worked over 360 to the most previous level of seniority. This is similar to assuming that
the worker was temporarily laid off, but retained his or her seniority in the firm when recalled.
Otherwise, we set seniority to the number of days worked over 360.
In the case where t = 1982 or t = 1984, if the preceding observation was 2 years earlier
(i.e. the missing data only occurred over a period when no data were available for any
individual), we increased total labor market experience by 2. If SIRENt-2 = SIRENt, seniority was
increased by 2. If SIRENt-2 ¹  SIRENt, seniority was increased by 0.5 plus the number of days
worked over 36018.
If the preceding observation was more than 2 years earlier, we increased total labor
market experience by 1.5.19  If the current SIREN and the most recent previous SIREN were the
same, we added the number of days worked over 360 plus 0.5 to the most previous level of
seniority. This is similar to assuming that the worker was recalled from temporary layoff with
equal probability in the observation year and in the missing year. If the two SIRENS were
different, we set seniority to 0.5 plus the number of days worked over 360.
A.2.5 Elimination of Outliers
After calculating all of the individual level variables, we eliminated observati n  for which
the log of the real annualized total compensation cost (LFRAISREit) was more than five
standard deviations away from its predict d value based on a linear regression model with
                                                                                                                                                    
were not given access to the data for these years. We largely discount the first possibility, since full-time civil servants rarely
move out of the civil service one they have entered (heron (1988)). The other two possibilities are treated explicitly.
18 We assumed that the probability the individual was reemployed in the missing year was equal to the probability that
the individual was reemployed in the observation year. Thus the expected increment to job seniority is the share of the year
worked in the observation year plus (1/2 · 0) + (1/2 · 1) = 0.5.
19 We assumed that the probability the individual was reemployed in the missing year was equal to the probability that
the individual was reemployed in the observation year. Thus the expected increment to total labor market experience is (1/2 · 0) +
(1/2 · 1) = 0.5.
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dependent variable LFRAISREit, shown in equation (36). This gives us the analysis sample of
5,305,108 observations.
LFRAISRE it   = -3.250
(0.005)
-X0.210 Malet +0.123 Ile de Franceit
(0.000) (0.000)
0.082 Yeart +0.056 Degree Category 2i
(0.000) (0.002)
+0.415 Degree Category 3i  +0.627 Degree Category 4i
(0.002) (0.003)
+0.266 Degree Category 5i  +0.642 Degree Category 6i
(0.001) (0.003)
+0.648 Degree Category 7i +1.421 Degree Category 8i
(0.002) (0.003)
+0.055 Experienceit -0.222 Experienceit
2
(0.000) (0.003)
+0.052 Experienceit
3 -0.005 Experienceit
4
(0.001) (0.000)
   N = 5,325,352
R2 = 0.437 = 0.477
     s = 0.477
(36)
A.3 Supplementary information on projection method variables
The derivation of the individual and firm effects took place in three basic steps:  an
estimation of the "first-step equation" derived as equation (9), an extraction and decomposition
of the individual effect (iqˆ ) into observable (uih) and unobservable (ai) components, and a
decomposition of the correlated component (litz
~ ) into the enterprise- pecific constant effect
(fj), the enterprise-specific coefficient on seniority (g1j) and the enterprise- pecific coefficient on
the linear spline at seniority of 10 years (g2j).
A.3.1 The First-Step Regression
Equation (5) represents the projection of the firm-specific variables onto firm and
individual data. In order to estimate the first-step equation (9), we require (in addition to the
seniority variable derived in section A.2.4 above) some firm specific variable (denoted ttiJf ),(  in
equation (5)) and a vector of means of some individual specific variables (denoted ix  in
equation (5)). We calculated firm employment directly from the firms represented in the DAS
data. The sampling scheme of the DAS ensures that we have a 1/25 sample of the private
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French working population. Since we have 10 years worth of data on the French economy, we
calculated ttiJf ),(  as:
ttiJf ),( = (2.5 X Number of DAS Observations for Firm J(i,t)) – 8.3
           1000
Although this measure does not vary over time for a particular firm, it does vary over time for an
individual who changes employers, which is the essence of our identification of firm effects
relative to individual effects. The vector xit in equation (5) includes time-varying
individual-specific variables. The vector ix  in equation (5) contains the individual specific means
of the two individual-specific variables onto which the firm effect was projected: individual i's
total labor market experience and total labor market experience squared at date t. These
individual-specific means were used in the calculation of the matrix zit. Table 7 presents the
variables appearing in the matrix zit.
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Table 7: zit Variables and Means (Std. Deviations in Parentheses)
Variable Name Mean
Firm Employment*Mean Experiencei ZXit 15.710
(746.422)
Firm Employment*Mean Experiencei
2 ZX2it 4.032
(222.783)
Firm Employment*Mean Experiencei*S niorityit SXit 726.375
(8,747.38)
Firm Employment*Mean Experiencei
2*Seniorityit SX2it 178.764
(2,752.69)
Firm Employment*Mean Experiencei*S norityit
2 S2Xit 7,766.07
(135,011.21)
Firm Employment*Mean Experiencei
2*Seniorityit
2 S2X2it 2,175.18
(43,035.26)
The first step equation (9) requires that the variables all be restated in terms of
deviations from individual-specific means shown below for men with
more than one observation (37)
LFRAISRE it = 0.073 EXPER it -0.451 EXPER it
2 +0.107 EXPER it
3
(0.000) (0.003) (0.001)
-0.009 EXPER it
4 +0.080 ILEDFit +0.084 AN77it
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
+0.169 AN78it +0.266 AN79it +0.394 AN80it
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
+0.615 AN82it +0.803 AN84it +0.860 AN85it
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
+0.880 AN86it +0.906 AN87it +5.237e-5 ZXit
(0.002) (0.002) (2.96e-6)
-1.477e-6 ZX2it -8.001e-6 SXit +1.977e-5 SX2it
(1.002e-5) (2.8e-7) (1.00e-6)
+6.99e-7 S2Xit -1.883e-6 S2X2it
(2e-8) (6e-8)
N = 3,248,901
  R2 = 0.604
   s = 0.245
(37)
and for women with more than one observation (38).
LFRAISRE it = 0.033 EXPER it -0.180 EXPER it
2 +0.040 EXPER it
3
(0.000) (0.004) (0.001)
-0.003 EXPER it
4 +0.078 ILEDFit +0.086 AN77it
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001)
+0.180 AN78it +0.281 AN79it +0.412 AN80it
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
+0.639 AN82it +0.827 AN84it +0.877 AN85it
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
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+0.893 AN86it +0.915 AN87it +5.573e-5 ZXit
(0.003) (0.003) (6.67e-6)
-1.29e-6 ZX2it -1.198e-5 SXit +2.847e-5 SX2it
(2.2632e-5) (6.0e-7) (1.9e-6)
+6.46e-7 S2Xit -1.713e-6 S2X2it
(6e-8) (1.9e-7)
N = 1,739,996
  R2 = 0.564
   s = 0.245
(38)
A.3.2  Imputed firm effects
For individual in firms with insufficient data to calculate a firm effect (less than 10
observations in the firm), we ran a single regression of equation (17), pooling all of the data and
assigning the estimated coefficients to all firms in the group.  The group included 1,353,794
observations (26% of the total), although it represented 86% of the firms.  The results of the
regression on this group are presented in equation (39).
DLFRAISRit = -0.028 +0.003 -0.005 sit
*
(3.375e-4) (8.476e-5) (1.772e-4)
N = 1,353,794
 R2 = 0.0013
(39)
A.4  Construction of the Firm-Level Data
A.4.1 Calculation of the Firm-Level Averages
We need to calculate aj, ujh and their respective variances based on the aj  and ujh estimated
according to the procedure laid out as above. aj, ujh are simply the means aj and ujh, weighted
by individual-years. In other words,
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since each aj and ujh is a random variable with known variance. The variables fj, g1j and g2j
already have unique values for a given SIREN (enterprise). Unfortunately, even having
restricted estimation of firm-specific fj, g1j and g2j to those SIRENS for which we had 10 or more
observations, we still ended up with some outliers. Thus, in cases where either -3 < fj < 3  or  -2
g1j < 2  or  -2 < g1j  + g2j  < 2, we set fj, g1j and g2j equal to the values estimated in the pooled
regression. Weighting by individual-years, this affected only 0.15 percent of the observations in
our sample.
A.4.2 Firm-level Employment and Capital Stock
The variable EFFEC (effect if, in thousands of workers) measures the total full- ime
employment in an enterprise as of December 31 (prior to 1984) and the annual average full-time
employment (1984 and later) as found in the BIC. We then took its mean over all years that the
firm appeared in the sample to get MEFFEC, the mean number of employees. Total capital in
the enterprise is defined as the sum of Dettes (Debt) and Fonds propres d'entreprise (Owners'
Equity). Our capital measure is equal to Actif total (Total assets) in French accounting systems.
This information was taken directly from the BIC for every firm-year. We used a
sector-by-sector, time varying index of the cost of capital (KAPP, 1980=100), available from the
Banque de Donees Macroeconomiques (BDM). CAPITR is defined as total capital divided by
cost of capital (in millions of 1980 FF). MCAPITR is the annual average of CAPITR over all
available years for the firm. The capital labor ratio is defined as CAPITR/EFFEC and its annual
average is MCAPITRF (thousands of 1980 FF).
A.4.3 Real Operating Income per Unit of Capital
We used the BIC to obtain the Excedent brut d'exploitation (Operating Income), or EBE,
for each firm in each year that it appeared in the firm sample. The formula used to calculate the
EBE is shown in equation 40.
EBE = ventes de merchandises (merchandise sold)
- achat de merchandises (merchandise purchased)
- variation de stock de merchandises
    (variation in merchandise inventory)
+ ventes de biens (goods sold)
+ ventes de services (services sold)
+ production stockee (inventoried production)
+ production immobilisee (unfinished production)
- achats de matieres premieres (primary materials purchased)
- variation de stocks sur matieres premieres
(variation of primary materials inventories)
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- autres achats et charges externes
(other purchases and outside charges)
+ subventions d'exploitation (incentives for production)
- impots, taxes et versements assimiles
(value added tax and other accrued taxes on or credits for production)
- salaires et traitements (salaries and benefits)
- charges sociales (payroll taxes)
(40)
The EBE was deflated by the prix de valeur ajoutee (value added price index), also found in the
BDM, to yield EBER (thousands of 1980 FF). EBER was divided by CAPITR (times 1,000) to
yield EBERC, real operating income per unit of capital (1980 FF). Lastly, we took the mean of
EBERC over all of the firm-years to get MEBERC, mean real operating income per unit of
capital (1980 FF).
A.4.4  Real Value Added Inclusive of Labor Costs
To calculate the valeur ajoutee reelle brute au coat des facteurs-(real value added
inclusive of labor costs), VABCFR, we divided the frais de personnel (employer's compensation
cost) from the BIC (thousands of FF) by the indice des prix a la consommation (consumer price
index) from the BDM to yield the employer's real compensation cost (thousands of 1980 FF).
The results was added to EBER, as defined above in section A.4.3, to yield the VABCFR, real
value added inclusive of labor costs (thousands of 1980 FF). VABCFR was divided by EFFEC
to yield VABCFRF, real value added inclusive of factor costs per worker (1980 FF). We took the
mean of VABCFRF over all of the years that the firm appeared in the sample to get
MVABCFRF, mean real value added inclusive of labor costs per worker (1980 FF).
A.4.5 Employment structure
The variable MING, proportion of engineers, technicians and managers in the work force
(EFFEC), was calculated from the ESE using the PCS occupation classification (35) for
individuals in categories 30 and 40. MOQA, the proportion of skilled workers in the work force,
was calculated from the ESE using the PCS occupation classification (35) for individuals in
categories 50 and 61. Both variables were expressed as a ratio to EFFEC and averaged over all
the available firm-years.
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B Model Appendix
Tables 131 to B3 show the first- and second-period wage equations for each of the
representative individuals as a function of the statistical parameters of equation (1) and the
parameters specified in each of the theoretical models in section 3.1.
Table B1
Matching Model with Homogeneous Workers
Individual Wage Period 1 Wage Period 2
1 y11 = m + a1 + fm = w* y12  = m + a1 + fm + gm = w*
2 y21 = m + a2 + fm = w*
3 y31  = m + a3 + fm + gm = w*
4 y42  = m + a4 + fm = w*
5 y51  = m + a5 + fm = w* - H/2 y52  = m + a6 + fn+ gn = w* + H
6 y61  = m + a6 + fm + gn = w* + H
7 y71 = m + a7 + fm = w* - H/2 y72  = m + a7 + fm = w*
8 y82  = m + a8 + fn = w* - H/2
9 y92 = m + a9 + fn  = w* - H/2
Notes: Individual 1 enters type m firm in period 1; individual 2 entered type m firm in period 0
(before period 1); individual 3 entered type n firm in period 0 (before period 1), had a
negative matching outcome and left for a type m firm; individual 4 enters type m firm in
period 2; individual 5 enters type n firm in period 1, has a positive matching outcome;
individual 6 entered type n firm in period 0 (before period 1), had a positive matching
outcome and remained in type n firm for period 1; individual 7 enters type n firm, has a
negative matching outcome and leaves for a type m firm in period 2; individuals 8 and 9
enter type n firm in period 2.
Table B2
Rent-Splitting Model
Individual Wage Period 1 Wage Period 2
1 y11  = m + a1 + fm = x1 - smQ y12  = m + a1 + fm + gm = x1 + smQ
2 y21  = m + a2 + fm = x2 - smQ y22  = m + a2 + fn  = x2 - smQ
3 y31  = m + a3 + fn = x3 + snQ y32  = m + a3 + fn + gn  = x3 - snQ
4 y41  = m + a4 + fn = x4 + snQ y42  = m + a4 + fn = x4 + snQ
Notes: The quasi-rent is -Q in type m firm in period 1 and Q in period 2. The quasi-rent is Q
in type n firm in period 1 and -Q in period 2. Individual 1 works in type m firm in both periods.
Individual 2 works in type m firm in period 1 and in type n firm in period 2. Individual 3 works
in type n firm in both periods. Individual 4 works in type n firm in period 1 and in type m firm
in period 2.
Table B3
Incentive Model with Heterogeneous Workers
Individual Wage Period 1 Wage Period 2
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1 y11 = m + a1 + fm = w* y12  = m + a1 + fm + gm = w*
2 y21 = m + a2 + fm = w* y22  = m + a1 + fm + gm = w*
3 y31  = m + a3 + fm = w* y32  = m + a1 + fm + gm = w*
4 y41  = m + a4 + fn  = y – dtq42 y42  = m + a4 + fn  = y + dt/2 q42 + dtq4
5 y51  = m + a5 + fn  = y – dtq52 y52  = m + a6 + fn  = y + dt/2 q52 + dtq5
6 y61  = m + a6 + fn  = y – dtq62 y62  = m + a7 + fn  = y + dt/2 q62 + dtq6
7 y71 = m + a7 + fn  = y – dtq72 y72  = m + a7 + fn  = y + dt/2 q72 + dtq7
8 y81 = m + a8 + fn  = y – dtq82 y82  = m + a8 + fn  = y + dt/2 q82
9 y91 = m + a9 + fn  = y – dtq92 y92 = m + a9 + fn  = y + dt/2 q92
Notes: Individuals 1, 2, 3 belong to type m firm with qi, i = 1, 2, 3 between 0 and 1/3,
individuals 4 to 9 belong to type n firm with qi, i = 4 to 9 above 1/3. Individuals 4, 5, 6, 7 pass
the test and receive the bonus; individuals 8 and 9 fail.
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